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CHAIRMAN HERSCHEL ROSENTHAL:

I'm Senator Herschel

Senate Energy and Public Utilities Committee. This Joint Committee
to

the recent wave of
As a

merger activities

of

California.

increased

and other

we have witnessed in the last few months a number of

which could

restructure the utility industry in California and the nation.
I want to know how these

will

and

by utilities. I also want to find out whether the laws and

are

on the books

sufficient to protect the public against adverse impacts which may result from these billion dollar
mergers.
I regret to say that most of the utility witnesses that are in the best

on what to expect from mergers have suddenly

to

to

This

been scheduled for months, during which time these utilities have talked to the press -- and have
even run full-page newspaper ads to communicate their views.

This is a reduction of a

that appeared in a number of newspapers. They have also talked to Wall Street financial
Public Utilities Commission, federal agencies, the courts, shareholders,

and other

affected groups. And they assured me repeatedly that they would testify today.
Now we are suddenly told that, upon advice of counsel,

cannot talk to the

Southern California Edison and San Diego Gas and Electric Company cannot coordinate their
then I

affairs in a manner which conforms to their longstanding commitments to the
wonder if either

of

is

a restructured

I am certain that
I

from each of these utilities are

want to let you know that I have advised

members of this

to

intention to schedule a

ect

which refused

necessary, from each of those

Hu•u.•,u=:

of most

hour

the

and excellent

scheduled.
In our first
associated with

we will get an overview of some of the national trends and issues

mergers and

from state and local
third
groups

this

in our second

we

receive

"""''"'''"'~"~

consumers,
to be affected by the
with an open
the

their name on the

and other
California

mergers.

we will close the

session to take brief comments from persons whose
Those

to

at

open

sheet which is available from the Committee

session

concern in this

is to

no more tha."l
ask you to sum
the entire

benefits or harm

to 15 minutes.

And I will inform you, when you are

because
~"'~~··~c·•

to

be

anybody to go

to halt

which exceeds this

the Committee welcomes written comments at this time or filed soon after the
added to our information.
to turn the -- I'd like to turn the hearing -- I was going to turn the

I was

this

over at this

to Chairwoman Moore and other legislators who may have an opening

guess the plane is a little bit late for some of the Members. But at this point, let me ask
the other Members of the

Committee if

an Elihu

would like to make a comment.

We

Wright, and Assemblyman Frazee. Any comment?

four witnesses for the first

come up to the front here.

Grosswiler -mike there so you can

Professor Fellmeth, David

-- Robert
Yes.

Two behind and two -- and you

it up.
Director of Merrill Lynch Capital Markets.

a

with Robert

ROBERT KING:

trouble

the microphone ...

ROSENTHAL: No mikes? Is there a switch

~4~. . . . , . . . , .

of your ...

that on?
ROSENTHAL:

That's on, and you can put that on your tie, if you

so you

hold it.
G: Is that

now?

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
KING:

fine.
that everything else works a little easier in

let's

started.
narne

Bob King.

Public Utilities Division.

I'm a

__ ,_,_,., .. ,.., Director of the Merrill Lynch Capital Markets group in

I've worked in this area for about ZO years.

to thank the comr. 'i ttees for the

On behalf of my firm, I

to participate in the discussion of a subject as

as the potential for consolidation within the electric utility industry.
The

of the electric utility

is of crucial importance to our overall quality of

This is particularly clear when one considers the degree to which our economic system relies on
reliable electric power.

like to state for the record that neither I nor my firm is an

advocate of, nor an opponent of, the concept of consolidation within the electric utility industry. It
been my experience that these types of decisions are best made by the managers and directors of
the affected groups. However, I would say that consolidation within the electric utility industry, to
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the extent that it is economically

and

enhance the well-being of shareholders and ratepayers.
the

the
and
the

environment within the electric
is
distribution of electric
forces

about

structure are

These forces include:

m certain

Significant excess

commissions in some areas

is elsewhere; two, the failure of public

owners

return on assets dedicated to
these assets to recover their investments; three,

advances which

of inner-company generation into savings through power pooling;

"'~~.,,~~

transmission

limits

for inter-region transfer; five, increased competition within franchised service territories
from

and independent power production; six,
generating capacity,

the

on the

from a

reduced construction
slower pace of demand

of utilities to invest in facilities when the

of loss

reward of enhanced return; and eight, increased

not offset

from the

imported electric power, particularly in the northeast.
In addition to these

from

competition is

electric utili ties are

natural gas.

from utilities and other areas of the

intense

electric energy and from other energy sources.
order to meet this

of other forms of

In a

themselves

from non-traditional
costs

In response then are

these forces

environment
increase.

not decrease.
increased

One

electric
to both of these
the consolidation

mergers will
realities and
financial criteria will be

in

the

mergers.
The

uuu.-.Jri

financial motivation

those which affect

investor-owned electric

businesses.
shal"eholder value. Shareholder values
one

all such
turn can be

mergers are
fall

of

value

of utilities

the
areas
issues and

and the third is
and structure

These

cost reduction

shareholder

and also the

upon the
to retain at least a m
has been stated

of

from consolidations within the electric

some cases,

different conclusions.

made that dramatic

At one end of the scale, the
number of

could be achieved
to a number about 30

of that which now exists.

the scale is the conclusion that

On the

from a merger could

efforts with the

a.uu.u 5

conclusion is that the

independent. I believe that a

in between these two extremes.

that the most

result from electric

cost
the

to load m anagem

to

efficiencies and facility

and lower-cost transmission access. I would note, however, that cost
can often be achieved without merger -- well-structured power exchange
power

techniques such as asset dispositions, sale,

and

on a

transactions enable the utilities to

of these savings without

merger.
affiliation of Cleveland Electric and Toledo Edison in Centerior
merger in the electric

is the

industry in recent

appear to substantiate this middle-of-the-road conclusion.
from the merger, Ted

c

~~,.. .... ~~

could be derived from massive

on prospective

that in

doubt that some of the

made sense,

that others had

on the

while

of revenue, in

consolidation

In

indicated that Centerior had

Chief Financial

about

the Ohio-

and I

consolidation.
"We find that some of

ected cost savings are overstated, at least in terms of our experience. Savings claimed that
consolidation -- excuse me -· the studies claim that consolidation would save many millions in joint
since the combined

would use the lowest cost, energy available.
coordinated dispatch between Cleveland Electric and

we, and

came up with hard dollar savings of about $2 million a year.

believe the studies others have made may have underestimated the inherent savings, innerpower transactions already
cost

by unaffiliated utilities." And that's close quote.

are achievable through merger, and this must be determined through

of each such --'-------'--' shareholder value can be increased only if such savings
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can be retained at least in part by the benefit of shareholders.
discriminates against shareholders m

regulatory

the

in many

that a

of

retained for

than pass

a

consolidation

this may be the most
assurance and a material

Without some

can be retained

have little incentive to propose a.-•d shareholders have

incentive

true when we consider

consolidation

a

associated

these

of transactions.
One additional but very important consideration affecting shareholder value is the
treatment of an acquisition premium.

Today's environment

may have to

to facilitate what it believes to be an economically justified merger based on
savings.

cost

However, if such a premium would reduce, not increase, its shareholder's value,

a

means of offsetting this type of reduction in shareholder value is necessary to encourage
of the merger.

To the extent an acquisition premium is paid and justified

must be permitted to recover that premium.
As I mentioned earlier, another factor which will determine

level of the

activity is the ability of regulated entities to structure, finance, and
Relevant in this
management

regard

issues.

are

These

shareholder-related issues,

merger

merger transactions.

regulatory

issues

and

and

factors will determine the framework and structure for merger

transactions that have been justified on economic ground.
For a merger transaction to be consummated, generally, the
The character and

ective of shareholders,

an acceptable transaction.

of

are

Historically, a very

of the common stock of

as well as those of gas distribution and

electric

a

individual investors
of

In the event of an unsolicited merger

more

to

shareholders.
utilities
unsolicited or

individuals
such a

a

from individual
other

as well as anti-takeover
been viewed as a

merger attempt between utilities would be

to succeed.

in recent years, a portion of electric and other
investors has

the character of

at

held

institutional

of

of a shareholder of a utilities as

to an

unfriendly merger
The effect of regulatory issues ru"'1d the need for
on the ability to
coordination
approvals, NRC, licensed transfer

any merger, either
with

will also have a material
or unsolicited.
federal and state

ru"'1d other

for classification as a

5

Act of

that any

merger be

extensive
up--

would observe that
considered

managements of

environment.

utili ties to

Or mergers that make economic sense will take

the pace to

not revolution.

doubt

consolidation

This observation

thesis that drastic

some

merger would

aware that

benefits to their

me to my

managements involved in recent

The extent that such benefits can be achieved

a

factor in the

necessary to

The owners of the business do not believe

these

will share in any benefit.

anagements and directors of these companies have found the regulatory allocation of benefits to be
of
to

to

little or no economic benefits to their shareholder.

to this dilemma is easier to describe than it is to

I believe that

foster a level of confidence that shareholders of
for

will share in the benefit.

which create

This will, in the

encourage

ergers that could reduce customer rates.
ROSENTHAL: Thank you. I have one question. I'm concerned about the
Street investment bankers interested in mergers that focus on shareholder windfalls
of other issues.
some vital

services.

mergers,
How is this

I believe my remarks at least
have to be from

involve
service factor

every other

for

The

, which

will have a look at the
to review them afterwards. I£ there are no

to the merger and then have an

there will not be any benefits to the shareholder. But my
the

accotu~ted

if not stated, that any benefit to

the merger.

California and

corporations

belief is, that if there

that the shareholders or the owners and managers of the business

to go to the -- to take the risk of a merger to try and achieve savings that will
on. I think there has to be a balance.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

Any questions from Members?

All right.

move onto the next Doctor-- I mean David Rosso, Partner of Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue,
at Law.
DAVID ROSSO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. First of all, I'm pleased to have been invited to
before you to discuss

concerns with regard to mergers and acquisitions in the

- 6-

utilities.
don't you pick up that

ROSENTHAL:
Is that

fine.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. ROSSO: Is that

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: That's fine.
MR.

Let me say that the views that I'm

not

those of my firm.

are

And let me also say

either oppose nor favor the electric

neither I

mergers and

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Let me just interrupt you for a moment. We have the Chair of the
Assembly Committee, Assemblywoman Moore. I understand that your

you would like to make an opening statement, I'm sure Mr. Rosso -- fine.

here.

see

was late.

Continue, please.
MR. ROSSO: All right. I should start by noting a little historical perspective, and that

that

consolidation by merger and acquisition was rather common during the earlier history of the electric
utility industry.

However, until quite recently, there has been very little such

approximately the last quarter century.

for

resulted

The first wave of mergers and

of many essentially local operations into the
1.10...'""'"' of the 1920s and '30s. After the passage of the Public U

the industry went through a lengthy period of substantial restructuring, which included
mergers, and acquisitions, as a result of efforts to conform to the dictates

Now that

2.30 investor-owned

of restructuring left us with an industry of

or combination electric and gas

that

most of which are

each

service within

service area. These investor-owned

utilities coexist

owned
years or
These
desire to achieve

service and

and economies in
Rather than

of
the

followed a different

such means as the formation of power
uuLAVH

to achieve these

in jointly owned

of
the utilization of

coordination

and

use of economy

energy transactions.
During the last two or three years, many
substantial

will
have reasoned

Some in the financial

cash flow, which many electric utilities

a

m view of the

outside investors will find it attractive to

control of a utility's common stock in a
- 7-

tr~'lsaction

at a

in excess

the

have

ected a wave of

in the

basic

must

now face in

as

restructured

consist of far fewer

of an

many more

a few
as common carriers of

transmission
a

and

which serve, at

number of smaller distribution

and transmission

be customers

recent months?

coincided

not seen the

to LBOs and tender offers
and tender offers from
unction with

There have been

first is the Alamito

which a

which then became
substCG~tial

outsiders or from

had earlier spun

war

shareholder

In a

company for

of the

in excess of 50

certain

tender offer.

the

launched two unsuccessful tender

shareholder's

three such cases of any

common stock and

of the common stock in open market

ective was to obtain control of the company in order to

real estate assets

were believed to have a
case,

value for

Service Company of Indiana was
ru~d

investors. This group withdrew when the

board of

would oppose the investor group.
area is the area of
a

which has been in the news and has been the -takeovers would occur of

to whether

These have

been motivated

rates due to recent rate basing of

investments and the current
Certain

of a

of the

of abundant generating

are

the possibility of acquiring all of the utility's

within the boundades of the

some of the utility's generating and

but not all of the

and

not the nuclear capacity.

and the City of New Orleans are apparently considering such proposals. Whether
see such transactions is open to
of abundant
future.

There are also instances of the

third

of merger and

A significant concern is that the current

for bulk power purchases may not continue into the
of sales of municipal systems to privately owned

transaction in the

- 8-

is probably germane

to the remaining smaller investor-owned electric
company like Utilico:rp

of which there are still a

known as Missouri

scattered smaller

Service

in the

of what has been

on for sometime in the water
We have also seen similar

for

Arkla.

While because of the scattered nature of the

much in the way of

one cannot

efficiencies due to

to

have the

natural gas

more

the benefits of volume

technical know-

on a centralized

processes; savings due to centralized accounting, data processing, and the
due to ease of
The fourth

cost of

securities issues for a
of merger and acquisition

and the one which is

most

interest to these committees, is the transaction which results in consolidation of substantial electric
utility companies. It is here that we have seen most of the recent action.

We have had in recent

times the formation of Centerior, the holding company for Cleveland Electric
the Southern Company acquisition of Savannah

and

the Utah Power &

merger proposal; the acquisition of Nantahela by Duke Power; the :recent

for a merger

Central Maine an Central Vermont, in conjunction with an acquisition of the non-nuclear assets of
Public Service Company of New Hampshire, which is currently in Chapter 11
proceedings; and the two proposals affecting this city, the San Diego Gas & Electric-Tucson Electric
proposal, and the SCE Corporation-San Diego Gas & Electric proposal.

for such

proposed industry consolidations include a variety of perceived benefits.
management sophistication is not an issue, since such large utilities do not
level of management sophistication.
customer cost

However, administrative and general cost savings, as well as

are often cited.

While such

to be on a very small scale
costs of enormous
area of

the

to the
such as fuel

of electric

maintenance costs and

costs. The

substantial

and
industrial load versus one with a

residential or

diverse customer mixes can result in improved
financial
from relative

and

load.

combination

such

which in the

reduce costs of

from relative power

fuel costs and

dispatch; from reduction in maintenance
possibility of retirement and liquidation of

with

and the

assets and deferral of

These areas should be
consolidation in order to determine the

to power

who are faced with a
benefits of such a transaction.

One important point to note is that such

-9-

may be

of

to a rn erger or

such as the

efforts

mentioned realization of economies
economic

increased power

coordination

j

and the like.

also bear

that

because such

is essential to

company, which
of caution here with

investors from

Such transactions

to the table

or economic efficiencies.

such efficiencies as may exist are

overall concern about the extent to which short-term
stressed

in our economy to the exclusion of

Such investors will be

economic

more than book value for the assets of the

will have more dollars invested which they must earn a return on.
rate of return on their

a

stock. The

way to
Their cost

Even if this
result of

Otherwise, they would be

ective of a higher rate of return on

investment is to increase

as

investment.

They also

are

to come

results in lower short-term rates to

of some of the

realized

leverage, higher leverage

increases financial risk in a company. Since the business risk in a company is not likely to
as a result of such a transaction, the company's total risk, which is equivalent to its financial
business

must increase.

in the long-run, cost of capital is likely to

in

Except in the case of a utility which is in

serious financial

or in certain

confess to some

divestitures of utility

benefits of such transactions.

A few words about the current

structure as it

tric

to mergers a...'ld acquisitions in

at the federal level includes the SEC, the Federal
Commission, Nuclear
Each of these

and the Department of Justice's
may have

on the nature of the

The Antitrust Division will focus on the competitive aspects of a horizontal merger.
will focus on the financial and
nuclear power pla...'lt.

competence of the resulting company in relation

The SEC and FERC will basically look at the various public interest

considerations which may be "!.ffected by the transaction.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Rosso, would you please end your summation.
MR. ROSSO:

All right.

I think that the criteria that must be looked at by State regulators

be listed as follows -- and some recent cases have listed some of these:

that the proposed transaction meets the test that it is in the best interest of the
consumers.
Second, the effect of

or absentee ownership.

- 10-

the elimination
structures.

the

financial
financial

credit
maintain a reasonable
condition of any

Seventh, the
continue to be
utilities.
agencies.
of economies.

the

Nine, the effect on rates.
fairness and reasonableness of shareholders.
the effect of the transaction on the customer mix a..1d
forecasts.
Twelve, the effect of the transaction on
and other

ected demand

with

in the bulk power markets

control over

access.

should beware of transactions which

I would say that

In

short-term

of
meritorious

will be

a
seem to be
meritorious.

transaction
turned down

Members

who

Thank you very much.

have

On my

Kille a who earn e
legislators from San

two

Mr. Rosso.

Power & Light merger, which
benefit.

late.

All

Bill

was

welcome --

and

I notice that we have all of these

And others may arrive.
the Pacific

maintained that a merger was not needed

that power

- 1

I'd like to introduce

Craven--

The federal administrative law

hear more about
He

have -- first of
Senator

a

here. That's

Let me ask a

to achieve the

merger

that basis. Thank you.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
two

a

and other

contract

some

the downside risks

merger.

that the FERC will issue ail order

comment is

not had a chance

call my office

come out
certain conditions

the FERC is

to transmission access.
think my remarks indicated that I do agree
can be
of the country already.

in a

I think this has

agree with almost

ean to say,
that there

rather

said. It doesn't mean to

Mr.

be situations in which the

will be

you have a consolidation. There

and that the

isn't

or bad in this. I mean

look at the
akes sense.

You

transaction and you have

who says all of them are bad is

them are

number of reasons, I

may be

do not like hostile takeovers.

when

utilities.

us an idea of what other states have done to

there

that is, the better ones are.

interest.

a broad standard.

It's almost

And it allows the commission to look at the various criteria. I hope that I
are

that kind of a

which are

California.

has to make the first
the standard be that
interest?

think the commission has to look at the
it has to make with

to -- a

will be consistent with the public interest or that it will
two different standards.

under various statute.

the various criteria the Mr.

to the

think you need additional legislation to

I

mission in any new way

feel for what the

well in line with the California

The California statute has a broad approval procedure which

to consider the

been

mergers, including

has been no hostile takeovers which have occurred, that

the statutes of the various states are

scope.

wrong; and

is wrong, in my view. Now that's just my •..

ROSENTHAL: For

ROSSO:

That

And as you undoubtedly know, they

Once it makes that determination, it can then

and I have both discussed and it should be able to get a pretty

benefits of a transaction are.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
ASSEMBLYMAN ELIHU HARRIS:
You

tell me one thing, please? I want to get

about the interest of the, the public interest.

understand what guidance, if any, the

has relative to what that is, i.e., if there is a

merger, there are certain benefits that may be achieved
et

the

to

And I'm trying to

administrative consolidation, cost

streamline operations or, you know, make better use of
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of the

merger involves

But

reimburse the
it involves a
the

an

if you

an

f"'A1FY\t"I.-

How does the

that back from the

than the

the direction is no more

in

run.

that in the

interest?

agree with what Mr.
have a

for the shares and there

has said on

you want to look to see whether

If it makes economic sense, there will be some benefits.

makes economic sense in the
can be either

or improved quality of service. They can be in various categories. Once you determine that there is
a net benefit from the

then the question becomes:

How do you

that net benefit

between the shareholders and the
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: All right.
MR. ROSSO: If you wish to see consolidations take place, which result in net economic
as a whole, then you must be willing to allow the shareholders to

to the
of those benefits.

in some

There must be a splitting of the benefits between the shareholders and the
the shareholders won't do the very mergers and

the very

which you would wish them to do. That's the first point.
As one of the costs of the merger, which perhaps have to be offset

the

may be the question of an acquisition premium and the question of how much of that will be
be recovered over what
the

It is very
should

of time for

that an

That is

of what goes into

the benefits that the merger

allowed to be recovered

shareholders and that the

stress "long-run"; I think you want to look at the

and!
would be better off

in
on this --

the other economies that

would offer

Should we
scope that
earlier which

as

needs to look at or

that o.r is it

a matter f:rom your

reasonable men and women, Public Utilities Commission
some of these

you

up their mind based on-- I mean

are

MR. ROSSO: Yeah.
ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: So

which to

judge. Obviously, it may be a first case first seen.
MR. ROSSO:

Well, no, I'm sorry.

I guess I don't agree that their

There have

been some already. The standards which should be .••
HARRIS:

I was

about a hostile merger.

You said

not been a

think that the standards

I

whether it makes

are very different with

economic sense between a hostile

There may be additional costs because of a hostile takeover. That

HARRIS: I think

If you have

an

to

a matter of

compa.."'ly -- and

worth to you as

It may drive up the costs

also in the
mergers in other
ers, but

to what it's worth to

fields where they can

then
of the

pass on the costs to

with other people who provide that same product. If

also have to

VU.I'-'\..<,k

reason.

there is only the PUC to stand between

<>TIO .. rMT

I guess I have two comments to make in response to that. The first is I
competing when

anyway, that is to say, that if it's

have an

it only means that the offer that was made was satisfactory to the management and
company so that they struck a bargain. If it
would come in and offer a

one, you see. So I think

in the market sense, I

in the agreed takeover.

there is a lack of
is when you say

the Public Utilities Commission", I don't think any
Commission"; nor do I think any potential acquirer

would say "only the

because in the end, the cash flow, the revenues for a

the Public Utili ties

And in the

the rates
Commission.

satisfactory, then

And I

it has to

those rates to the

know your California Public Utilities Commission.
But I would

have been

I

that they are
as familiar with these

this

and that

n"''"'""" read all of the

If they

criteria to the

won't have any

lawyers like me will

them out. But I wouldn't be too concerned about

them on

ASSEMBLYMAN HARRIS: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTH.\L: Yes. Ms. Moore.
GWEN
want to follow a little

Thank you.

Let me direct my question to Mr. Rosso, I

if I can, as I'm trying to understand, as Mr. Harris says,

whole idea of the public trust -- and the idea, as you've pointed out, of hostile takeover in the
field
not so new."

is a

new phenomenon which you kind of vacillated between and said, "Maybe it's

But I guess the real

that I have, when we talk about this public interest, the

whole notion of a utility being involved in this share of takeover and changing its operating form or
it's

or doing what is necessary when you diversify and do a variety of things is a little
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that is known the

different than the

has

been

service area and do that well. But when you rriove

is there to

:reconcile that

to answer your

I guess I'll

MR.
VVJt>..AU,~

a service to the

I'm not

sure what

is that

for but
I guess what I'm

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

with that of a takeover which

for is:
to

Tell me how do you :reconcile

to its shareholders? California's

to be reasonable and

that the :rates a:re

The

move into a takeover, you may or may not be talking about reasonable and

in the sense of

trying to make up whatever the costs that may be passed on as a :result of that takeover.
MR. ROSSO: Well, I agree with completely that the primary role of a public utility is to render
and safe service to its customers at reasonable

Now, there

you and I, as to what reasonable rates

be some difference between me and somebody
should be. But I think that ••.

MOORE: You eliminated affordable. Is that not -- what do you think? .••
I don't know that standard. We don't have that out in the Midwest. I would

MR. ROSSO:

~-'"'uu.u•.~

on how it's ...

MOORE: Good reasons.
MR. ROSSO: Pardon?
MOORE: Reasonable cost.
think that

at a reasonable

as

whether

entities and who
and safe service at

be

basic test. And

say
MOORE: How

you

20 years. I
think that the commission is used to
AV\J!l,d.U"'

at

Now I say, that
have to be

at

you have

situation in

those

benefits are
about net benefits now.

that
those net

because

it

take

shareholders don't

If the

some benefit

their new benefits. I
to

be
to look at the

to determine whether

which

and the cost

then

has indicated --

-- that the shareholders would take a

Mr.

pay-

that.

the difference and

mean
can, over a

it would be reasonable to assume that the benefits would

so I have to assume that the same standards would
what I said with what he

may

MOORE:

him

to shareholders.
if you

to him and I

you

for himself but I was
Let me ask you:

but that

assumed that you were

to the

Do you think the shareholders should

the
I think you

makes economic sense and I

to
think

situation.
one, I

looked at these two

It sounds to me like

had one,

to render on whether

think I'm smart

think made

be on the other side on it. It

do make sense and I, you

that may be

That one, I

so

that

makes sense or not in

give it here today.

ROSENTHAL:
MOORE:

was

to answer on

pay-back.

it may have been to your considerable advantage that you missed my remarks
been late.
is

if

come

in a merger,

to have to demonstrate

commission would

No public

-- or

that came in and

it were
I've won

cost another 5

the way,

to

that there will be

started out with the

c

in

in Ohio about three years ago, and

was involved in it.

of their revenues in

now say that

believe that those

it.

made in sworn

• That

action which has reduced total cost.

increase.

I think that

should be

whether there should be a time

rate of return. I

My sense would be that that higher rate of return, the return-on-equity concept, where the PUC
the return necessary to attract capital, 1 think when the
reduces cost,

of that should

into a

take an action
what I think of as a

return.

sharing of benefits. That means it's going to cost the ratepayers less and the shareholders are going
to get more. It's the two together.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

So you're saying that, that in some notion, that that would be

on in part; they would split the difference, the ratepayers and the shareholders, in terms of •..
MR. KING: Without specifying how that would be split, yes. I think it has to be

on

both sides.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: But that has not occurred in Ohio as yet?
MR. KING:

They haven't had a rate case since -- they haven't completed a rate case since

then. I believe that that is true.
MR. ROSSO (?): There is one pending.
MR. KING: Yeah, there is a rate case pending.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

There always is a rate case pending.

(Laughter)

Somehow or

never seem to resolve it. Thank you.
ROSENTHAL:
ROBERT C. FRAZEE:
mergers as if

ect

L"'-'"""a""

Both of the discussions so far seem to treat the
And I think in the case of most

about pure
are not

California

utilities.

diversification or are
seems to me that that is a

And it

factor in all of this discussion. It should

an Arizona utility that just announced, I

for the first time in their history,

at a reduced dividend and that :reduction is

that

included. And I want to

as a result of their non-

And when the Public
where is their latitude at

you

at all of these other diversifications on the

of utili ties these

days.
MR. ROSSO:

with you.
diversified

must

the

think

in the

of

company, that a state commission should and
look at the

as a stand-alone
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I think that generally the

of a

company has its own debt
from the

and
company. 0

businesses
reflection

the ups or the downs of those other

a merger or

then

situation that the -- or a

entities are to focus on the
to look for the

where

not

to them.

in

in one way or another.

the interest
FRAZEE:

that

my view.

based on its attractiveness to

overall

that

investor and therein

costs for the

of that

this

I

at another forum.

and his businesses do
company goes into

So what?

and
be in

The

be an asset of the

which is in

have to come
it will not
commission

the basis

It may cost the Public

Commission

ouvu,Au

return for a

which may be

the economic situation is.
I

op '!:rations should

agree, that in the

the way I think
that the

•v•.u~.~-L

financial

or would affect the

of

confidence that you do in that

MOORE: Just

interest. Under

one of the

and to follow-up what he was asking-- it
mergers to

the stock would be diluted

I think -- what is it?
the rates in such a manner that the

And then

made whole again with that 6 percent that would be diluted

the

MR. ROSSO: Yeah, I hate to duck the question but I don't know

what the ...

let's

a,

a

dilution of the .••
you mean

MR.

?

MOORE: That the stock would be down 6
And

back -- shares would be
such manner

it would

and in order to

then should the PUC

the rates in

would make it whole?

MR. ROSSO: You mean the value of the stock will be down 6
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Right.
MR. ROSSO: How can you tell that?
MOORE:

the way that --

the amount

share.
MR. ROSSO:

You mean that San Diego is paying a premium for Tucson's shares in terms of

the •••
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You paid a dilution of the overall.
MR. ROSSO:

Okay.

And you're saying that the net book value per share of the combined

company will be 6 percent lower than San Diego's current net book value?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: That's correct.
MR. ROSSO: Is that it? And then the question is: Should the commission

in order to

restore that 6
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: That's correct, collect back from the ratepayers back.
MR.

Well, I think the answer to that is -- and I really haven't thought this

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Mr.
MR.

if

is

wants

his head so

You can understand that.

MR.

the

think

are

This goes

ASSEMBLYWOMAN '"'""'-""'short-run.

he wants to answer.

he can be my

ASSEMBLYWOMAN

MR. ROSSO:

but

I

your

utili ties should

looked at in the

and not in the

tried to make that clear in my statement.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I understand that.
MR. ROSSO: But I mean I
is

split

the

to be for the

restore the net book value per
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
And at what
MR. ROSSO:

that if there are sufficient

do the

a new

there to

and if you

to restore the net book value
but

vu.uu.~::.

you

that
of the

from the shareholders to

there to

But the
start

so that

for some way down the road.
restore it?

this

of

that

come into these

at every

there

the

of the way--

to be some reflection both

some benefit

Bob?
MR. KING:
did say.

my head in what I

I

But as an

David was

in the Centerior merger in which

the combination that

are

that to increase and

a premium paid, if there had

I would argue that some

1n

have entered testimony

million a year and

If there had been a dilution

that as the

to say in which he

amount of that dollar savings

gone to cover that.
the form of reduced rates. And let's
and I have not done these numbers and it may be
I think one must focus on the

merger,
achieve the merger.

But if that

disadvantage the shareholder as to

And I think
for shareholders.

inaccurate. That would
to the ratepayers.

you

say that one

m

agreement on there being

And if there

anything to share, then

no economic benefit.
guess the other

is

some things that are done

basis and

some

that would

to the merger that may cause some savings. And I think

or

to be some manner or some way or some vehicle in order to make the determination
a cause

the

whether it was

MR. KING: I think that is best addressed

that had to have occurred

your commission looking at the facts in the future.

I'm concerned about was ..•
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MC10RE: Was there a dilution in the Centerior ..•
MR. KING:

There

is in one side or the other unless done strictly on a book-to-book

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
MR. KING:

not with one of the proposed acquisitions for San Diego?

this is a transaction which took place in 1985 or '86 in Ohio which I was

one of two

But subsequent to that in sworn testimony, the Chief
have saved about 2.5 percent of their rates which resulted in a

of about $55 (million),

a year directly as a result of efficiencies arriving out of
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the company.

So my position, and I think David would

it, is you have to have

the shareholders out of that.
ROSENTHAL:
Committees is there any
you

Thank you very much. Let

All

ask

ections to cameras in the room?

as

okay.
MR. KING (?): It's your right side, huh? (Laughter)
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Very good.

Okay.

Our next

Professor Robert

Center for Public Interest Law, University of San Diego School of Law. Welcome to the
PROFESSOR ROBERT C. FELLMETH:
Committee.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Members

My name is Bob Fellmeth. I'm a member of the faculty of the University of San

Law School. I teach California Administrative Law and Practice, Consumer
Regulated

Industries.

I

direct

the

Center

for

Public

Antitrust Law and

Interest

Law

and

edit

California Regulatory Law Reporter. My publications include .c:T;_h_e_In~te.:..r_s_t:...;:a.....:t:..:e:.......:....:...~;;;....:.::...::...;;__;:_::;.::;:;;;..:.:.:..:=:_.:.::::'
a study of the ICC; The Nader Report on the Federal Trade Commission, the

1968; and the treatise, California Regulatory Law and Practice, with my colleague, Ralph Folsom.
The Center for Public Interest Law has been involved in the representation of

consumer

interests before the PUC since 1982, first through Michael Shames, proposing and

the case

creating UCAN, the ratepayer group which interacts with San Diego Gas & Electric and
recently representing the California telephone consumers in the commission's

divestiture

rate proceedings, now in their third year, and confirming Assemblywoman Moore's
rate proceedings as interminable.

of the

I understand later witnesses will be commenting on the more

specific issues raised by the SDG and alternatives and various merger alternatives available now,
I propose to focus on the underlying concerns to contribute to a conceptual framework for Com

considerations and address some of the questions that the Members of the Committee have
raised.
As the Chair

But

before

utili ties now
is

committee and the

this

to the merger.
to excuse

argue that it is a
merger

I

mean to

fundamental unit of political authority.

a

but the State

I believe its

the

It's our

may be the

institution in our society, the repository of the power to tax, to decide what is and what is not a
criminal act, and to protect the citizenry from a variety of
entities which have obtained a dispensation from the

That power does

seem to be limited somewhat by some 28 propositions, however.

However, utilities are

natural monopolies which, to quote the regulatory legal term of art, are "affected with the
interest."

They are given that most precious of

an exclusive franchise to

a

necessity substantially without competition.
Moreover, the owners of those utilities are

- Zl-

as a matter of

to a fair rate of return

The first element of a

structure for this Committee is the full

this fact: Those stockholders

to a

which benefits

market-related rate of return on their
cost
that

And

expenses

PUC disallowance of rate increases.
that cost

made

unless disallowed

will determine

a

such a disallowance is

And in the case of a momentous decision to
and may even be foreclosed if

merger or rules are

is w! act of

the FERC, as

arrogance for a

subject to such a

before its state Legislature.

decision to decline to

to that declination

that this Committee

those

I

would

considering the following

the documents from the utilities relevant to

of these
variables we shall discuss and then

who will not know the answers to

not the

the work papers and business

officials

but the middle-m
utilities.

on two technical

I want to comment

affect the

because

very

seem technical but they are

and

for your policy

consideration.
an instant cure for insomnia here but I want to

I don't mean

is
these two

do affect the framework.

issues with you because
over the

retail power within their

includes the

mergers or, for that matter, any

have

we have that jurisdiction delineated in

at least in
of the PUC Code

acquisitions.

any

as

Harris was

concerning criteria to

It simply hands the ball to the state PUC without any

or disallowing a

the federal level, vests authority in the Federal

42 USC, Section 7

Commission to

Keep in mind,

and does not, in any way,

of that section is very, very broad and

whatever.

State regulatory

mergers and securities

Federal Power Act is limited and

under the Federal Power Act

unclear where the lines are between this power

to regulate mergers. I'm sure that that's going to be subject to litigation to come.
issue

is

complicate,~

the

1968

and Exchange Act of '34 to

Williams

Act.

That

statute

amended

the

for certain filing and disclosure requirements and is

because in 1982 the Supreme Court decided Edgar v. Mite Corporation, interpreting the
reach of the federal statute. In Edgar, Illinois had attempted to review a tender offer for a Chicago
company with its state takeover review law.
was

an

"indirect

burden"

on interstate

On a close vote, the
commerce

and struck

Court held that the Illinois Act
the Illinois statutory

review

So you must know at the outset, what is the test for the balancing of interest under
that criteria which will determine whether or not your state PUC or the FERC may well determine a

- zz-

merger review and merger

very

to effectuate a legitimate local

statues

it will be

commerce are

local benefits.

excessive in relation to
a clause modified
the test in Pike

a

modified

Church and

that state

will

such as the

in

Transportation Law Journal of '86.
the

another """"u.'""'•

a test which 1s very unclear at this

Some commentators believe
mergers,

seem

I disagree.

an

I think that a ''no" to a merger under Section 854 of

is very likely to withstand a federal preemption argument,

However, given the water power features of many utilities
possible purchases, it might be wise to fashion the PUC's
balancing tests extant.

in terms consistent with the

And that would require amendments to Section 854 and you better start

thinking about it because you may have no PUC jurisdiction if Mr. Berger, Professor
substantiated by the courts.
In addition to the basic jurisdictional issue of merger
conflict

the basic power to set rates.

to be very important.

a less-discussed

And you better understand this too because this

Now the FERC jurisdiction, federal

ratesetting for the wholesale transfer of power.

is established

Wholesale

becomes much more

as the utility structure grows in size and complexity. A

structure

a

company, or perhaps a number of holding companies, will be
When it does this, it operates wholesale. Only the final sale to the power
:retail. When it

the FERC can

a fair

the

for the power.
What if the state PUC
uu.~.~::,,cu.c

is excessive?

Can

that
disallow the costs?

The

on June 24 of this year indicates the

a

costs

company to

the retail

pay

costs as

of the state commission.
The case indicates two
merger

federal

but is :rather certain to be

transfer power

after it.

not

on the

To the extent

entities

even entities

sales through successive
at the federal level.
company

be

X to

them

m

may

Where the FERC declares the
Y is their

subsume :rate

of power

power

and the customers of Y must pay it as

is unclear what is left for the state agency to do.

The solution here is, once

to amend your
- 23-

to

to

the PUC to intervene in all FERC

or

we should be
tests
No adverse
Now which
on the

The federal

which sounded like it was the
and we have a representative here to
left -- case back in

consistent with the public

does not connote a
interest ..•

benefit to

derived or

one

the idea of a promotion of the
the

federal

appears to be rather easy, no

&

as
of test of Connecticut,

grave concern, or should be of grave concern, to us here in California.
to turn to the theoretical
comments that

and

been

to

-- and

going to disagree

so far.

with Mr.

Power utilities are natural

a

has many advantages and

is
extent there is a mix of natural

and competition,

because there are enhanced, additional abuse as
I want to talk about the theoretical advantages of a merger

lower
rests on some

and

what's been

of scale or traffic

to consider that many utilities exhibit diseconomies of
certain thresholds and many are well
in the rate

that

that have been
And

a

on,

consensus that there is

traffic across the same fixed cost structure are

Now it is
and

regression studies, and we've
no overall economy of

Inherent economies of scale which may attend

now in terms of that

territories are

done our own studies of

unlikely in a merger where

hooked
that one company

structure will have assets of particular use to

a synergy or there could be a traffic sharing, as is often claimed

these mergers. But

counter-consideration alluded to by Mr. Rosso and

want to make it as clear as I can. The sale or lease of a11 asset by one partner with the other could
be

contract in an

marketplace setting. It's perhaps more likely

that the merger will create a captive market for the interchange, foreclosing the full range of
as the "partner" is favored; that

the use of the excess assets or power of merged entity

go to Y automatically if X and Y merge. But if they are separate, Y might search a wider
-24-

and obtain that asset or power from source Z at a better

for its

The second possible advantage is the acquisition of a more diverse base
of
of

also mentioned

Mr.

and

a different combination of assets to

This rather unusual benefit-- and it is unusual-- may well be
merger if the extremely low-cost Hoover Dam and other sources of power available
which may be made available to SDG&E
assets are

at lower rates as SDG&E's more

can be.

if

may be quite simple -- a change of management --

A third

the

managers don't parachute out at a price making their presence a bargain. I have
more direct approach to management failure.
market does as much as possible.

advocated a

I strongly believe PUCs should

what the

What does the market do when management creates

twice the cost level of competitors?

Theoretically, before it goes out of business, its stockholders

notice dividend sinking; through its Board of Directors, they fire management; they bring in a new
team.

I would argue that management of a natural monopoly without the inconvenience of

competition and at rates of pay more than ten times we offer our legislators should not be viewed as
a lifetime sinecure. It should be viewed as a precious opportunity totally dependent on
performance.

Failure

to meet performance guidelines for

cost reductions and

improvement should result in PUC rate increase grants conditioned upon a
management.

in upper

No PUC has ever used this obvious remedy and this committee should consider

legislation to introduce it.

That option would be preferable to management change

the

of a merger process.
Now that I've listened to the advantages, although with some

I'd like to

address the dangers.
The first is the natural outcome of any
merger involves

Lord

of economic or

smaller is

of balances -- checks.

is a necessary evil.
and

of its natural
American

And a

famous dictum

is more than a .__ .. ,.'-.. ''"' it underlies our
a natural

power.

that

qua

from any

is not better.

all other

local is better. A second and related disadvantage to

to extend the monopoly structure into the competitive sector or to
and technological process {sic) from challenging the sunk cost natural
The facts of the AT&T case illustrate the

may be the enhanced
forces
investment structure.

consequences of such enhanced powers

natural monopoly. It can take many forms -- refusal to

a

cross

The second general disadvantage is the loss of a yardstick, that is, the regulator does not have
another separately accounted
performance of the natural
natural monopoly in a different

with cost and rate base measurement to compare with the
I think more sets of decision makers, even where each has a
has

for the
- 25-

Not only does the

of

but there is

a..'1.other team

to

and reduce costs.
pose for state
and

a

or area of

examine a contract between two
of

Yes.
ROSENTHAL: -- conclude?
FELLMETH:
as I've

a merger occurs,
sector or natural

where a

firm

ect to other jurisdictions, there's a
the transactions that occur. We have also
as the mergers grow, become more

for very unusual reasons.
mergers have

adverse consequences for the
to

carry
the standard used

the State

under a standard of proof,

New

of benefit which must be the focus of that showing-- efficiency and

There are two
vague

to lower

terms of traffic

but demonstrable facts showing enhanced efficiency and
and fixed-cost utilization. Since there is nothing intrinsically

about a merger in and of
"'"'JI..W.u.

The

and

are intrinsic

of momentous consequence,

must be based on facts and numbers with a proactive

have
and with the

of interveners for the competitive sector and for

interests. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
ROSENTHAL:
ASSEMBLYWOMAN CATHIE WRIGHT:
m

know if

I

the four of you can address. I
to this

for

that you can directly

know how you want to handle it. But I've been

on back and forth.

"''j'"'•u15 about mergers 1

a

And what I see could possibly happen, when

you could end up with only two utility companies in the

of California-- the north and a south. And then my concern would be, you know, we've put so
vua"J""

in the

forms of energy and also even on the point of independent

on

of energy. And you

that whole together, it seems to me as though we'd be destroying

And is that one of the thrusts of the idea of a merger is to eliminate all
the smaller competition? Because I know you mentioned-- the Professor mentioned "wheeling". Of
course,
som

then brings in your

producers. I'm just wondering if there's -- if there's

else in the background besides just the fact the economy of scale and such.

PROFESSOR FELLMETH:

Well, there's going to be

terms

you're going to have

if you have a mix of

the extent

an

and

of

and so
could still
under some kind

I

But there are some

rational at>d careful

in

run

to allow you to measure different schemes and different formats of
kinds of

you the kind of

It

which I

which I think affirms the value of

different

for

and

of decision m

local control and

MR. ROSSO: Well, I guess I think that it may or may not be a

to have two

in the State of California. It really depends on whether

benefit of the

consumers and the economy and the shareholders of those, of the

And I

as the

Professor said, I don't think it would necessarily foreclose IPPs, industrial --

power

producers or cogenerators. In fact, it would really depend on the extent to which the utilities would
be interested in building additional generation or in buying additional generation. And so I don't think
it would be either necessarily bad nor necessarily good. It just depends.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any further questions? Thank you very much. Oh, yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
Congress to overturn that decision.

Incidentally, we did try to introduce a resolution,
And you know what they do with those resolutions, but we did

take a look at it.
If you were rewriting 854, you were amending 854, what would you put in it?

PROFESSOR FELLMETH: Well, what I would do is I would, I would really follow
Harris' advice or suggestion and I would list some of the criteria.

an

First of all, I would

in a

specific burden that requires the proponent to affirmatively justify the merger, which is not there at
Secondly, I

require that the merger demonstrate enhanced
the -- and

of the

in terms of use

investment of the

and that be an

factually based demonstration that must be made. I want to see increased utilization

affirm

or enhanced traffic distribution or enhanced asset use and I would

the fixed

;.;c:.ucu

out in the statute.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Edward

see those

All

Thank you very

Now the final one in this

Director of Governmental Affairs, Pacific Power &
would you

highlight the issues that have been raised

Commission, FERC,

Company. And in your
Federal

your merger proposal.

MR. EDWARD GROSSWILER: Thank you, Mr.
like to do that in response to questions, if I

Members of the Committee. I would
and my remarks are

brief so there'd be

adequate-CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
MR. GROSSWILER: -- time for those
We

the

to

here
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about our merger,

tah Power &

could do

not be here.

I

your
refers to us, a
counties. We also sell
state.
to merge. And since then the
the seven

where we

have

state. At this
Commission
We do remain

The merger from

is

the
do it

approval at FERC.

effort to reshape the company for

commercial and industrial sales volume

is threatened

loss to onsi te cogeneration in the industrial and

Another one-third or 700 average megawatts of primarily

power sector.
loss to

other

of natural

but I would

at threat from
several years,

arily on

Just how competitive that marketplace

the fact that one-third

threatened

Rosso has

about
vuJ:;v•.n):;

energy services

be demonstrated

as

action. I can tell you that they

We'll check this

a more

the merger,

not really familiar with the
that with one-third of our resources

no longer be defined as a natural monopoly.
has

reduced our workforce, for example, by

over the last four years,

and attempting to enhance service by

For
investments without

we wrote off several years ago hundreds of millions in
recovery from our customers because we felt a commitment to

stable and

was an

for several years.

committed to

For

three

And while we do have rate cases pending in

are for :rate decreases

in the

I guess, is an indication of rate cases go on

have underscored the immediate necessity of facing the
The

new circumstances

and

commissions and the FERC have

are responding
advances. Several state energy

implementing new policies and exploring new rules

govern the
To

recent merger and
technology, and the

character of the industry.

For

in proper context, it is important to understand
regulatory response have changed the fundamental
as never before, choices now exist.

For utilities,

has replaced the tradi tiona! assurance of rate-of-return regulation.
customers can now select among a variety of utility and non-utility suppliers, other fuel
sources, and energy service providers.
or

in their service.

their load demands lose

They want, and are willing to pay for, differing levels of
No longer the sole suppliers of electric power, utilities have
smaller scale generation technologies, improved
- Z8-

measures, and regulatory change have increased competition for customer
At the same time, because not all customers have the
service

to choose among energy

must continue responding to the

core residential

When marketplace customers leave their utility's systems, cost consequences exist for those
customers who remain and bear an increased burden for the utility's fixed costs. Because
been sensitive to this situation, our price stability commitment, which

has

in all states,

core customers as well as to marketplace customers.
In an environment characterized by uncertainty, traditional
supplies of power are being re-examined.
constructing large generation plants.

to assuring

Sources of alternative supply are

sought in

of

"Off-system" power is playing an increasing role in

customers' needs. Price and meeting customers' needs have become primary concerns of Pacific
Power.
To compete, utilities must be able to offer customers what they need and want; otherwise, they
face the unprecedented risk of losing customers and having to increase prices for those customers
remaining after other customers with choices leave the system.

In order to offer customers what

they need and want, utilities must have available a flexible array of supply and service options.
We think the merger with Utah Power & Light will do that. It will benefit California customers
and, in fact, all Pacific customers, through long-term price stability and a more efficient
energy service.

of

California customers have received a firm commitment over the next five years to

no overall price increases. It's flat, no overall price increases, no increases because of inflation or
fuel adjustment, no price increase.

California utilities will also benefit because the wheeling

proposed as part of the merger assures all utilities non-firm and firm access into and

the

company's system on an equitable basis.
The merged companies represent an extraordinary strategic and geographic fit.
that I think was addressed earlier is particularly important to this merger.
company and UP&L
economic

consolidate

load.

is a winterTwo

can

and reduce their

reserve

are better

The
the energy services
suppliers of all

in summer, their air

And a point

This

is characterized

of energy services.

The merger will have positive impacts on both

operating costs.

It will

to

substantial savings in net power costs. It will enable us to be more efficient in
it will

resources and to make additional wholesale sales at enhanced sales

In

permit savings in such areas as

legal -- I like that

data

inventories;

part; the next part I don't like -- government affairs, shareholder relations, and power
maintenance schedule.
The merger will enhance
need for new power supplies.

and
These positive

efficiencies.
will make

It will

reduce the
substantial benefits to

FERC or any other

of FERC.

Mr. Harris.
HARRIS:

have one

et cetera.

But

You

to customers in terms
customers

seems to me,

not residential customers. I know

been a lot of competition

their own facility, their small facilities.
Could you

that?

The residential

GROSS WILER:

in our service territory have -- we

from a
ents.

I don't know that

especially in terms of the

In Northern C

and in Southern Oregon, more than

of our customers use wood as their
the more urban areas. But Pacific is

source. This is obviously not possible
a company that serves rural areas. So in addition to

have the natural gas
the state of the
•u•~•'-''-uu~:::.

is such that today, as we speak, the commercial
are able to go to other sources.

small commercial

In addition, in

we do have state laws which permit the formation of public power

of our service
on a

basis.
I want to thank the panelists for their input

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

with state and local regulatory issues, members,

and ask that the next
forward.
Commissioner of

The

San Diego, Maureen O'Connor; Mitch Wilk, Mr. Wilk,
Office of General Counsel

Peter

of

of PUC;

Robert Mussetter,

Assistant to Attorney

and Michael
of Justice.

California

of the

Thank you for making it possible for us to

of San

here.
You're

MAYOR MAUREEN
CHAL.~MAN

ROSENTHAL: ••• to

MAYOR O'CONNOR:
like

welcome, sir.

the football team that I saw yesterday.

as you well know, sir, all mayors are not perfect and they can't
wish

could

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Welcome.
MAYOR O'CONNOR:
do not

rhank you, Mr. Rosenthal, Ms. Moore. Good morning. For those of you

Maureen O'Connor, the Mayor of San Diego.
I'd like to welcome you to San

And second, I'd like to thank you for allowing me to

this morning instead of this afternoon. I must preside over a council meeting and would have
been

if I'd not been able to testify before you.
The merger mania that has gripped this country since the early 1980s has produced, in my
any number of dangerous undercurrents for our economy.
it has lessened, not increased, competition. Second, it has increased, not decreased, the
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out one's competitor.

to

mountain of debt

And

it

reduced the

needed for reindustrialization or modernization of
an entire

the so-called

of

ania affects San

as merger

More

in the nation but are in

are the seventh

hostile takeover battle with Southern

which is in a

San Diego Gas &

c

make us the

Such a takeover would not

us of any local

but will also

on

and rates

In

addition, San Diego stands to lose at least 1
I'm not defending San Diego Gas & Electric. In fact, I have fought with the utility on more than
one occasion. But I am defending San Diego's right to have its own
with it

as

often as

we

wish

to.

As

in its own town and to

Southern California Edison

manages

to

San Diego Gas & Electric, who among us will have ready access to the new Los

based

executives? Who among us will be able to ask for support for our local charities and expect any
term help from a Los Angeles based company?

And who among us believes for a minute that a

erger will in any way reduce the ratepayers' bills in the

are

the second

highest of any utility in the country. I can only speak as the Mayor of a very

and wonderful

that strongly opposes the intrusion of a Los Angeles based utility into a town

a potential hostile

takeover and the guarantee, in my opinion, of higher

rates for all of our residents and

commercial users. I have to believe there's a better way to do business than for a San

company

to be once again swallowed up by a Los Angeles conglomerate.
me out of order, and

Thank you very much for

oy your

in San

Thank you.

of the Mayor? Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you.

a devil's advocate. You know

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

time.

MAYOR
MOORE: All the time.
my, shall I say,

WRIGHT:
advocate.

should San

But

tate of California? I mean

different than any other

with utilities or
we

in the
and

none of them

dealt with Los

because we don't, but, you know, what,
particular utility

to be the

come from a

that
are based in Simi

be

in the

And I

say that we love Los

-- would make it that San Diego, as far as this

would be necessary that it be based here and why not in Los

say, a district office in San
MAYOR

we have a

I don't know if that was the case when you were mayor of your
that you were mayor of •.

and I

now.

know the size of the

I can almost be assured that it's a lot smaller than the second

largest city in the State of California.
deserves to have its own

company based in San

I think the second
in Sa..'!

in the State of California
have to tell you that a lot of the

1-

&: Electric

and

am one of

that we can

were not

I mean we've had a lot of power

And

to the local

district

the

I don't see any real

see any benefit as

don't see any benefit to the

in the

not

of San

how

to go to Los

in

as

see any benefit
I

over the last

here to solve them is

located in Sa..•
I

customers

cu,,., .... "''L' but we like to

the service to our

because in the long-run, and this is

to be able to do it for less.

Maybe in the short-

no.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Frazee.

ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE:

is not an additional concern of the City of San

based on the fact that the franchise

that SDG&:E has with the City of San Diego is

much more beneficial than is Southern California Edison's agreement with cities within their
And I believe that's the case. And obviously, if there were to be an acquisition, I don't
that there would be an allowance for a
the rest of the service

significantly higher franchise fee in San Diego
Southern California Edison. And then that loss of

of a

to the City of San Diego would have to be made up by the taxpayers in some other form or in
of services.
MAYOR
have to say that that could

be correct. And also in our charter states that the Mayor and

are the ones that are

to be having this hearing and will be the ones who decide

we will agree to the shift of the franchise. But it just seems to me, if what you
and I

have any reason to believe that

what we're about here.
we

ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE:

to

I mean, see, I don't

fine here now.

and services received for those taxes.

There's no

better off.

But

is fine but I think the real concern is for the taxpayer, the

rates and then taxes

worried about.

should we take less?

We are about keeping it locally based.

have our own company. We're

MAYOR

not--

The ratepayer is the ultimate person that we have

And I have not been convinced in everything I've read that our ratepayer is
And I saw some of the -- a.•d I don't know if this is true -- what they're

but I don't think our employees are going to be better off if these practices come
San
ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE: Thank you.
MAYOR O'CONNOR: Any other questions?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: All right. Thank you very much.
MAYOR O'CONNOR: All right. Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Our next member we will hear from is Mitchell Wilk who is a

missioner on the PUC. And let me just mention that, because of the time frame, I'd like to limit
each of the panelists ten minutes. And when we get to nine minutes, I will let you know. So instead

- 32.-

of reading-- and I have a number of presentations -- but you couldn't

this in 20 minutes

and so you're going to have to summarize a little bit for us. Thank you.
COMMISSIONER G. MITCHELL WILK: Thank you, Mr. Chairm
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Mr. Wilk.
COMMISSIONER WILK:

Members of the Com

Madam

President

(Laughter)
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: What'd he say?
COMMISSIONER WILK:

I will be much briefer than-- is this on?

okay. I will be much

briefer than the ten minutes, Mr. Chairman. I have just written out a few points that I want to make
because I think, frankly, the value here today is to ask questions and to see what kind of responses we
can
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: And I understand that you have to leave so you have to do that.
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, I will certainly stay the length of the panel, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
COMMISSIONER WILK: It's my pleasure to do so and I'm glad to be here.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Mr. Chairman, just one question. Is there something wrong with
Mr. Wilk?
COMMISSIONER WILK: I was about to make the same •.•
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: He seems to be alone. Everybody else went back there.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Because the Mayor was going to be sitting there but she decided to
stand.
COMMISSIONER WILK: No, that's okay.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: You may do so if ...
COMMISSIONER WILK:

I always sit by myself, Senator.

Sometimes it's safer that way.

It's

also an easier shot.
I have probably as many
many of you know, the
Edison.

And we

we have as many

or issue

as all of you do about the issues that are before us
of course, is

are the proposals
from SDG&E

even have a
in case

as you do.

taken some action that I think

As

with SDG&E and
So as a

not aware of

the PUC has

our initial concern over these issues.

It was my

commissioner's ruling a week ago to a variety of parties, including the City of San Diego and UCAN
and others, asking a series of very hard-hitting questions about the issue of the activities of the
Edison Holding Company in its purchase of a thousand shares of stock; another question having to do
with the conduct of one of its officers in the

of

and several other

having to

do with the adequacy of the existing PUC Code and how we ca11 assure ourselves on the commission
that both the conduct of the parties, as well as the outcome of this, will be in the ratepayers' best
interests. And for those of you that have not received a copy of that

I will make sure that you

have one.
So we are, in fact, already taking action. I think the two relevant questions today regarding the
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Commission are

What are the criteria we will use to

these

what is the process we will use to consider them?
criteria that I believe this commission will be
the outset that these are

I think I need to say

new area for all of us and we

are

to evaluate these
ect to some
forward to the

will be

additional

the second caveat is -- this is

ladies and gentlemen.

that we need to
some very careful

So let m

criteria in the Code and I would urge

to that before you proceed because every merger and

that strikes me is very different. Based upon my experience so far, we need to
careful about how we start
the criteria that I, as the

the criteria in the Code.
a.:.::u.~,uc:u

and I think my fellow colleagues would
all classes -- residential, consumer,

in this case, first and foremost, a
and yes,

What is the

to be on all of these different ratepayer

of course, is

considerations.

obviously, it would be the cost to power, both in terms of its generation, its distribution,
transmission.

Diversity of supply and fuel mix,

cost structure of a m
of concern.

what is that

We will not tolerate a diminished quality of our

of m~.'"'""''"' .....

the management going to look like when it's all
of service. These are all obviously directly related to the

also very concerned about the

need to

to look like? Load balancing is obviously

of

done? And, of course, the

mean all

important. Operational costs and the

And I

on

Productive

are content and happy employees and we

resolution to these issues as soon as possible. I have been a victim of holding
and I can tell you there's nothing worse on employee moral

and merger

on local interests. I think

heard a very concerned Mayor O'Connor this

and I have to admit that I am
to agree with
because

mean just union or non-

with some of her concerns, although I
about the issue of whether or not cities deserve to have

happen to be of a certain size.

big cities. The

have to take a look at Oakland and San

of course, served by PG&E.

impact on the state economy and the utility infrastructure of this state.

We can't

the fact that all of this fits together into the California and that in terms of its attractiveness
to live, work, and invest.

We need to pay very careful attention to the quality of these

and what they bring to the infrastructure of the State of California and the utility
infrastructure.
impact on the financial strength and the viability of the combined entity. Is this going
be

or are they going to use all their resources in the purchase of a utility and find
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themselves in financial trouble?

are very concerned about that and we'll

We

closely at that.
on
A

We share the concern,

General's Office.

been outlined

not the only ones that are

antitrust and

We look forward to the very active involvement of the

General's Office

have antitrust

make certain that we

and that the interests of

served.
So those are
final analysis,

the criteria as I see them at this
the criteria we

ladies and

is no more

In the

than the process we use.

understand Pete Arth from the staff will be discussing that process with you.

it's

to

be open and deliberative. We're not going to rush the judgment. And we want to have the benefit of

as many

parties as possible. These are new areas. We

want to take the time

explore them and at the same time reach a conclusion that does not create the kind of

of

that frankly, obviously, exist today in San Diego in particular. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you. It's my understanding, Wilk, that San Diego rates are

declining and Edison rates are rising and that by next year Edison rates may exceed those with
At the same time, Edison has promised to lower San Diego rates

10

if a merger

If that's exactly what appears to you to be the case, can you ensure that Southern

California Edison ratepayers are not forced to subsidize San Diego

as

of a merger

deal?
COMMISSIONER WILK: You bet. I don't think that's-,- first of all, let me say that I agree with
assessment as to the direction of the different rates.

It is clear that within a year, at the

earliest, possibly, perhaps two years, the rates will cross and I think that adds an
dimension to these issues. And there is --I can't imagine this commission

different
a mandated rate

reduction for San Diego on the backs of Edison ratepayers. That, as far as I'm
that would be

that we would, we would have some

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

shareholders to pay for that
COMMISSIONER WILK:
in any

to

Just as a

could you condition a merger upon

rate reduction?
as

understand

it's the shareholder money,

where the
This is not

to come
money.

And

where

the stock differential and others. This is not -- if Mr. Allen wants to reduce rates for
have to do it in a way

San

balanced

doesn't come on the backs of

But the money that is being used to finance all of the component parts of the
as I understand it -- and again, Mr. Chairman, I don't have their
upon what

read in the newspapers,

This is

based

as much as what you've read in the newspapers.

understanding is that those funds are coming from the shareholder.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

You've touched upon, and I'd like to just follow up on my concern

about the manner in which Edison used its holding company and affiliate to pursue its acquisition-COMMISSIONER WILK:

sir.
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What

San

does the PUC have to deal with

......,,,.u.'"' in our statement.

read you the

relev~~t

In

of the

Let me

go ahead and ...

Excuse me. Does

have a written statement that's been

COMMISSIONER

is I

the

I can w:ri te those notes up

wrote some notes and

like.
you had a written statement that you were

no,

ROSENTHAL: He wrote them out this
written this morning, right?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

deal of

and

to the preceding

to do this.

from the Public Utilities Code

does SCE

under decision 8801-063,

or case law have fewer restrictions than Edison
merger with Edison. If so, in what

Does the mode of

affect the answer? If so, how?

structure of the
in the process

a public utility must the acquiring

for commission authorization under PU Code 854?
commission have
2 11 and ZllZ or other enforcement
make sure that all of these

corporations or persons
of the Public Utility Act?

to you,

____

but we are asking the very same

I have one other question before I turn it over to

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
And
_,__. I'd like to ask some

_...:..._

What

I'm assuming that there are substantial costs being incurred as these various utilities pursue
merger

In

if there's a hostile takeover, legal and other costs could be

For example, we already know that the Edison deal would require a payment of $25
million to Tucson. Who pays for these costs? Ratepayers or shareholders?
COMMISSIONER WILK:

Well, if SDG&E has to pay a $2.5 million penalty to Tucson Electric, I

would oppose any ratepayer impact, any ratepayer payment of that.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you. Assemblywoman Killea.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN LUCY KILLEA:

I have a question.

Since you were here for the earlier

discussions -- see, you are surrounded. You may be out there by yourself. (Laughter)
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COMMISSIONER WILK: I don't even have a wall to back against here.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN KILLEA:

One of the opinions was

that there

about whether or not the PUC ultimately will have

e

because based on certain

other cases that have been presented. Do you have any comment on that?
COMMISSIONER WILK: Well, of course, lawyers will disagree. I'm not a lawyer. But I am very
confident, Mrs. Killea, that the PUC -- first, let me tell you that, contrary to the impression you
might have gotten this morning, earlier, is that we are very active participants before FERC,
the FCC, and other federal agencies constantly fighting for our state jurisdiction.

And frankly, we

feel that we are in very good legal position to fight for that. And I don't fear, I don't fear that we're
going to be preempted on something like this. But again, lawyers will disagree. I'm confident
given the size and diversity of California, given our very open, deliberative process, I

think that

we have quite that level of fear. But again, lawyers can disagree.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any further-- yes, Ms. Moore.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

A couple of questions.

I listened with interest to your criteria

that you set forth, or at least the issues that you indicated would come into consideration, and I
concur.

I also concur with you that probably California is on pretty safe ground in terms of

jurisdiction that's afforded us under the Section 854 and otherwise because I do know how we have
vigorously fought for our rights as a state.
A couple of questions come to mind. You indicated in the issues that you raised that you would
be looking in applying certain standards and you talk on one hand of no adverse effect to the utility
and then on the other hand-- to the ratepayers-- and then on the other hand, you talk about a
positive ratepayer benefit.

It seems that those two are in conflict.

Which would

be the

standard?
COMMISSIONER WILK:

Well, I think at the very minimum.

I'm not sure that they're in

conflict, Mrs. Moore. I think •••
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I mean they take two different approaches,
WILK:
minimum standard.

They do.

I think, at a minimum, ratepayer indifference is the

But frankly, we would like to see ratepayer impact because mergers and
for tremendous

for load

for diversity of supply and fuel

mix and other ~-···-.-.·~·
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I understand that. That's why I questioned •.•
COMMISSIONER WILK: And so we're looking for ratepayer benefit.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

Okay.

So then you're saying that then the standard will be a

positive one-COMMISSIONER WILK: Yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- of ratepayer benefit?
COMMISSIONER WILK:

Perhaps I could put it a slightly different way because some of the,

some of the criteria I suggested, frankly, obviously ratepayer indifference would also apply but ..•
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: No. Let me see if I can keep you on my track.
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there is a total different

when

talk

When you talk about a
me that the standards for
would

sense to pursue.
to hold you to this

this is all

iv1itch.

The other

that you

was one that you would not rush to decision.
MMISSIONER WILK:

correct.

MOORE:

a

Which is

different than the

that the

in in some of the other areas. What do you see as your time frame on this in
talked about

deliberate kind of

process where people will have

you

And I assume that the Mayor of San
everyone else that wants to have some

and

into this would

What kind of time frame do you see this occurring?
very

to

Mrs. Moore, at this point.

from San
are in

But

Again, we

that we can get the

we obviously -- it is our intention to either

under the umbrella of a

proceeding both the Edison and the Tucson

about that at this point instead of other proposals, and that I
we could reach

decision for the

of the

as to where their livelihood is

who are very

to have a decision within six

But I would think that that would be the earliest.
MOORE: So you do see an

process?

I think a year -- see, I don't

but you said six
MISSIONER WILK: Y
world

to think a year is expedited.
which is

six months would be the fastest track. And again, the
to

and I will also

Mrs.

is that we are not going to make a mistake on due process.

We are

commissioner in the case, I have already agreed

as the

we will hold hearings here in San

That would be, that would be

who want to be heard are heard. It'll be a full,

to make ::ertain that the

deliberative process. In

this tomorrow at our other

as

to make certain if we have full access to all the

views.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
process.

You talk about -- there is due process and then there is due

And, you know, coming to San Diego, holding a one-day hearing where people don't have

much notification that it's

to take place, and while it's extending the PUC's opportunity to

serve the kind of purpose that hopefully you're attempting to get. And so I
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of notice and all those things before

that there'll be

San

do

so too. It's
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

further •.•

ASSEMBLYMAN FRAZEE: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

an Frazee.

MOORE: Oh, one last -- and then I

ask anymore. You indicated

you felt that before we would start to take a look at 854 that we would take into consideration some

The

and issues that you raised are very broad based and would

be

of avenues that we would look to include in terms of setting forth some minimum
the PUC would follow.

The importance of such a statute -- and I would

Mr. Strumwasser, when he speaks, could speak to that, could also

to this as him

that
an

attorney. It would seem to me that it would give us greater strength to have it in statute rather than
just having the PUC by policy or practice to derive some activity.

If it were part of the ongoing

statute to mandate that certain criteria be followed would give us greater standing if we ended up in
court battling over our jurisdictional rights.
COMMISSIONER WILK: I don't quite know how to respond to that, Mrs. Moore, because I'm not
a lawyer. But as a practical matter, I have to look at it as a regulator.

And at this juncture,

the diversity of the proposals that we're talking about, it is speaking for myself personally, it is very
important for our commission to have fairly wide latitude in terms of the criteria we use because -case.

case

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, I think the criteria that you set forth was very •.•
COMMISSIONER WILK:
you

But they apply, they apply to, for example, electric mergers.
merger. I mean

we've got, we have the

sense of the word.

we

have -- so in other

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

looks

have

but I think that some of the

the ones

the

think there's some broad-based kind of

of California that could be broadly discussed in that kind of criteria and
there to

in the classic

very

And

that you talked

I mean there are certain
utili ties or the gas and

basic criteria that are true in any merger, whether
And I

"'-'-4'-'-'''-'·"""

would

would not be necessary. C
what it

have load

on the
the PUC would be

it.

COMMISSIONER WILK:
your staff on that.

be available to work with you, Mrs.

Well,

My

is that law is -- you

absolutely have to. And I would urge that we all
into law that frankly

the law unless you

very careful consideration before we

have to be there. I think that the constitutional

this commission to protect the interests of

and

is a very

us our marching orders in every one of these insta.."lces and

of
and one that

us the kind of latitude we

of

you to
to do that.
understand yours
think in the
here in
some

criteria •••

with you, Mrs. Moore.

raised the issue of the
and I was
has not the PUC
on that
some

in the

effective with the

of the concerns that we had in
affiliates.
c:ri te:ria that
transactions between the
about the
concerned -concern about whether
to subsidize our
transactions and the
not sure if

FRAZEE: You are.

Thank you.
Tha.."lk you very much.
COMMISSIONER

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
who

understand is

to

The next

is Peter Arth, also the General Counsel of the

us some of the criteria as to process, in ten minutes or less.

PETER AR TH: Thank you very much.

name is Pete Arth and

here mostly to give a

perspective on both the criteria and the process that we
options.

will occur with the SDG&E

As was mentioned this morning, it isn't a new

in

Section 854 in its

to the pension between the two major utilities. What you see
to trucking companies and water companies.

And indeed, that is the

economies of scale have occurred and

where

had merger and

This obviously is different and in the interest of time, I would say from a criteria

there are

to be two major questions asked. For the given option, is this really in the best interest of the
ratepayer?

And I would amend for the DRA

the best

interest of the

And secondly, and this is sort of where the rubber hits the road, how are we

to assure, in the

decision that deals with the option, that the benefits offered are in fact the benefits realized?

And

the track record that we have is limited in terms of major stationary monopoly-type utilities.
The Commission recently approved the Pacific Power & Light UPL merger and what they did
was, I think, a very encouraging sign. In making the traditional litany of benefits proposed, one of
those was that the combined cost of operation would be lower than on a stand-alone basis with
Pacific Power & Light in its rural California operations.
the case, prove it."

The Commission said, "Fine. If that is, in

And the company acceded to a condition in the decision that says, as

Mr. Grosswiler mentioned earlier, that they shall have no rate increases for their California
operations for the next five years.

But again, that was an easier decision because very small

California impact-- and they had the diversity benefit that was a clear winner-- with the CP
national application that was just recently filed, where they're going to merge or be purchased by
Alltell, which is a Midwest telecommunication company. Again, this gets into some of the traditional
items -- rural service by the acquiring entity, rural service by the present entity, better financial
strength should be economies of scale. But then we start to get into the holding company issues.
Now a California utility operation will be answering to a Midwestern larger concern and it's
to be important to assure the performance by using the protections, some which will be in the
decision, we hope, some which are a consequence of the legislation that is passed in the last several
sessions that assures access to the books and records of the

and annual reporting as to exactly

going on to the extent there are cross subsidies between the entities to the extent that there
are combined dealings.

So this is where the support

and the

net start to come into

With the SDG&E proceedings and the options of either nothing, the Tucson option, or the Edison
option, there's basically going to be a one-two-three-type approach and in the interest of time, I'd
adopt Mr. Rosso's sublist.

I think it was a good list of concerns.

as a stand-alone cost, expense,

But to look at the SDG&E

and see where the

ent

stand-alone

versus combination, for the given combination to make sure that it is the best possible combination,
do not limit it to what is actually before the Commission, in the application, but to see hypothetically
looking at the contract options, looking at the resource options, is there a better way to go, and
to improve what is being

and finally, the

and

where the rest of

the panel has come into play, to try to get before the Commission not only the strict economic issues
-41-

issues

alifornia

of
what
of the

that
process of
occur.

We

we
to make

that did some

described that you now
the other concern
be used -- and I
bothers me, in
of

process, do

Commission has been
merger the no adversewant to see a
But

merger and

think everybody is going to demand a benefit and it's simply

to be the most

benefit

in the eyes of the Commission.
MOORE:
about whether the size of the

and I think that, of course,

this whole notion

has anything to do with whether a

remains or not.

the real question is the fact that you have one here that's been
the

I think

And while its record in

has not been one that one would hold in high

it

has turned around

a number of the alternatives that I think one of the earlier

describe that

to be considered before you look at mergers and consolidation. And I think
utility that has moved down that path, I think some of those

when you have

also have to be taken into

consideration as the PUC looks at what they're going to do.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Thank you very much.

We'll move to our next panelist,

Robert Mussetter, the Commissioner on the California Energy Commission, and an admonishment, ten
minutes.
COMMISSIONER WILK: Also take your sunglasses off, Bob.
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: If I do that, I can't read.
necessarily those of the Energy Commission.

These views are mine alone and not

The Energy Commission has taken no position on

mergers today. However, most of the statements that I'll make are entirely consistent with
other well-known positions that the CEC has taken, notably, its long-standing consistent position and
support of a new interstate natural gas pipeline to serve the

{inaudible)

in Kern County and

elsewhere in California and its ongoing effects of our efforts to assure power supplies from out
state.
California must open arteries that bring energy into California.

We have arteries on the

highways and the people are finding them and they're coming in here, as you all know.

And without

recognizing that overriding fact, I think this whole discussion is a little bit off kilter, myself. I think
the

who sat down here where Mr. Wilk is

on his list

now, Mr. Rosso

had as number

access to outside power sources. And I think that he doesn't understand

how the California market

As a matter of

ladies and gentlemen, you must

about consumer welfare inC
the rates that are

bulk power
30

as

of course,

in California would go at least 20 to

as that. And we need to

interests want to close them down.

that without the

these channels up.
very elementary.

As was brought out, Senator Rosenthal was there, what, a week ago in Los Angeles at our Gas
ent hearings.

Virtually every speaker

is needed is to promote shopping options to enable

that the primary reason that another
people, such as Edison, if you will, to

have more options open to them in the acquisition of their energy supplies. In that case, it's gas but
there's not a bit of difference between gas ru"'ld electric in this regard. So I tend to view these merger
proposals as substitutes for transmission and then managem

issues.

I would take issue with the Mayor of San Diego, who I'm sure is making her statements with the
best of intentions. But has she

and considered the number of obs that
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be created in

of

deal a..r;d you

go

when it was

those

went ahead and had the
to the
which makes your rates go up,
their power from out of their service

now I think

make me

a lot of

somewhat

home

over the

how

a home

I come from a

where we've

held open

franchise has

the
the way around.

their net worth is

tremendous
one merger
course.

What about all

at the state?

There are more than two.
It's twice the size of

ent of Water

a

We see,

this commission

my, what

would see

company as small as San
ents that are

two and a half years

in

to meet all of the

on it. It has

been

hard at it.

But they

don't have the resources to do the kinds of
game. I think Mr.
folks in Sa.r; Diego

has done a wonderful
underestimate the
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with what

had to work

but I think

that he has faced in turning the

company around as much as he's been able to.
We need to remember

and I will agree with the Professor on

issue here that you-about the

an Moore -- has been

of the FERC over the bulk power m

some

is what

know how that's going to come out. I've got some staff

that there is a

amounts to. And I

papers here from some of our legal

staff and they say essentially what you've been saying this morning, that it's a tangle, it's unclear, it's
unresolved. But we face in California a much bigger and more adverse monopoly in the Bonneville
Power administration than we do in any of the monopolies that we have in the state, at least in my
judgment. And Bonneville is hard to deal with, not only because it's big, and has all of the power grid
in the Northwest, it can block out the Canadians. But it's also awfully tough to deal with because it's
a federal agency.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Mr. Mussetter, is the Energy Commission concerned that mergers

may lock utilities into high-cost supplies and limit competition for cheaper alternatives?
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Just the reverse, Senator. In my opinion, the buying power and
the routes to the cheaper sources would more likely-- and this is pre-analysis, you know.

I mean

we're talking out here without having a staff foundation, but I'll say it anyway, for sake of argument.
If I were to guess today, I would guess that you're going to benefit both in San Diego and Los Angeles

from an SCE San Diego merger because, for instance, you've got -- it could be very well that
acquisition could make it possible to defer the Palo Verde Deever (?) application.

Edison would

shutter to hear me say that but it might be true. If they gained access to the power link, that might
be just as good for the time being. And I would even say that it might be something to consider to go
ahead and let the Tucson merger proceed, certainly listen to everything.

And Mr. Wilk's agency is

going to have to do all that. And then presuming that that does go through, then look at the Edison.
And that might turn out that that's good too.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

If mergers lead to greater utility consolidation of transmission

facilities, what do you think will be the impact on wheeling a<'ld competition?
I don't think your premise is necessarily true.

MUSSETTER:

are in favor of is more transmission routes not all controlled
be, it's

of the state. It

that if you had what I
to build these

But it takes

time
you're ever

the same

into the

What we
markets

proposed, you could have that for a
and do these

I don't know that

to -- no one's proposing to shut down the PUC. You're going to still regulate how

much money they can make.
What I'm

about here, instead of having a bar chart this high, which has this much

shareholder earnings in

have one this high with this much shareholder earnings; you don't change

anything there. The difference is what the ratepayer has to pay. That's gone down, you see. That's
what you should be after.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I think I have a right to respond. (Laughter)
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Since you were singled out.
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when my consideration was about

effort that

came to a

can
business of

and so

one.
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER:
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

an Moore.
A home commuter-- a home computer-- is

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I guess

because you said so many ..... u"'·"" that I feel like I need to

to. But in the

do that.

time.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN
of tim
your comments
is

He should sit down there with you.
of

come to mind.

not

I want to follow that along
You were

the creation of

that would occur with the Edison merger.
you meant

we were

MUSSETTER:

that she has not

that?

fine. Do you remember that?

Edison--

a fact

San

--has had

years.

MISSIONER MUSSETTER:
WOMAN MOORE:

yes.
And

COMMISSIONER MUSS
before

be even lower than Edison next

that

is fine.

But what we're talking about

Before and after
Um-hmm.

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER:
see lower rates in San

All

What I'm saying is that it would be my expectation

after the merger which you would not be able to see prior to

it.

MOORE: But that has nothing to do with the merger and that's what we're
talking about. Further, you indicated the creation of jobs and that's what my question was.

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER:

Well, from the lower rates flow jobs because energy

in the economy. That's the very thing that the two utilities are
And so

ASSEMBLYWOMAN
businesses not

over at their ...

into one of

rates

such

so

that

therefore can create more

more

business would be-- one of those kind of numbers?
but •..

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER:

MOORE: The trickle-down theory? Is that •.•
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER:

No, I don't think it's trickle down.

I just think it's

old

economics.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, I mean that's •..
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: If you're going to run a business ...
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I won't say voodoo, but I ...
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Your costs are important if you're going to run a business.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

No, but I just really wanted to, you know, kind of pursue that a

little bit because the whole idea of merger are efficiencies and all these other kinds of things that
generally follow along the lines of the concerns that the, and I must say, quite valid concerns that I
believe the Mayor raised and I think, that, you know, that sometimes, we, you know, this case, this
whole trickle-down kind of philosophy is substituted for what we know to be the very sound kinds of
things that we can see, that we can see right away.
COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Such as what?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
energy.

You also talked about, a couple of your projections on the

And you talked about the pipeline hearing in Los Angeles and that, with this kind of

that Edison would not, was not dependent on-- I forgot, I can't remember exactly what you said. But
I guess the point that I want to make is: Don't you believe that Edison pretty much has a monopoly on
the bulk transmission as

with or without the merger with San Diego?

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Edison has a

hold on the transmission situation. But those

if you examine who owns them, Edison

own them all. San Diego owns some of

ent of Water: & Power owns some of
MOORE:
what we're

and ...
go into

I

But still the transmission is the

about.

COMMISSIONER MUSS ETTER: Well, but that's
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

to answer your question.

But part of the thing-- no.

ultimately, who's going to be the producer and that kind of

being on the

My question really goes to,

But I guess the other question that

I :really have, and I guess it's one that I should have asked Mitchell
emphasis on

L.A.

it's one that, with the

and all ou:r questions have pretty much focused on that,

what really happens to the gas side of the house under a merger and how do you handle that in your
deliberations on the acquisition?
COMMISSIONER WILK: Who are you

a.<>J'-Hl.~

Bob or •..

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I guess

interest is in, at least as the
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And what
sure.

the

after he •••

co

run for the ball for a while.

What's going to

side?
after

the ball.

But go ahead.

Go ahead.
COM

LVU..Ju.£.\J

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: What's
ASSEMBLY

to the gas

MOORE: Uh-huh. What do you see

as a result of ..•

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: I don't know
if it

is that your question?

to

to it. That's up to Edison to

that far.
sure

M

Edison. I think the gas side continues to thrive.

up

think that we have ...
was: How do you

guess my

I mean

gas and electric compete with

from the gas company and
that
the fact of a merger

that into your equation

competing for new
will continue. And I'm

creates an imbalance in that competition

one company that does both. You've got it
a company that does

one. And I think that, as you consider that merger, that

be taken into consideration. And my
how do you

to balance out whatever concerns

COMMISSIONER WILK:
as

understand the gas

that

was really: How do you plan to look at that and

to

~~·~·""~

as I
the San

arrive from that kind of thing?
the gas -- Bob , correct me if I'm wrong -- but

Gas & Electric

its gas from SoCal.

I don't see

as a result of the merger. But again, we don't have a proposal in front of

us ...
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: You talked about competition-COMMISSIONER WILK:
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- between gas and electric.
COMMISSIONER WILK:
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Does that mean, that if you've
over

that there may be some movement or some shift towards
oved to

the gas company, gas

a variety of things?

COMMISSIONER MUSSETTER: Well, I think it offers the potential, at
competition into the Southern California gas picture.

of bringing some

That's what you're really looking at here.

I

welcome the idea of Edison getting into the gas business because I think SoCal needs the competition.
we haven't even talked about SoCal this morning.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

Well, okay.

Fine.

So that's going to be one of your

Mr. Wilk, that, as he indicated, that it would be -COMMISSIONER WILK: Yeah, I mean •.•
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- a standard of getting into the competition in the gas •••
COMMISSIONER WILK: I'm afraid we may be overstating the impact if Edison gets involved by
purchasing SDG&E that suddenly it finds itself in the gas business. It's still dependent upon Southern
California Gas Company. I would urge you not to overstate the impact.

I mean in some respects, I

think Bob's absolutely right, to the extent that they are able to .•.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'm not overstating it. I'm asking you what you plan to do about
it in terms of looking at it.

So what you're telling me, that my concern is unfounded and that you

won't even look at that because there's no reason to.
COMMISSIONER WILK:

Mrs. Moore, I don't say I won't even look at it.

I mean the fact is,

we're going to look at the competitive aspects of this merger, and it's not just limited to electricity.
It's the whole -- as I indicated when I listed the criteria earlier, we're .••
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: So you're only interested in the gas side. The house would be the
competition aspect?
COMMISSIONER WILK: I think that goes to the heart of your concern, yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: No, but okay. I
COMMISSIONER WILK:

I'm sorry.

want to know what you're going to ...

Maybe we can discuss it later, Mrs. Moore, and we'll

certainly pursue it.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
Strumwasser,

Let's move on.

And the final member of this panel, Michael

Assistant to the Attorney General.

MR. MICHAEL J. STRUMWASSER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Caution.
MR. STRUMW ASSER:

Caution understood. You have my scholastic rendition. I wouldn't dare

to provide you a live performance of that.
Let me say, first of all, that Attorney General Van de Kamp shares the concerns the Committee
has already expressed about the merger trends in the economy generally and in this industry in
particular and has been active in trying to fill the void that's been left by laxed merger enforcement
at the federal level. Let me also repeat the caveat that appears in my written remarks, and, that is,
that this is a very complicated question. I'm sure, at this hour, nobody doubts that and that we have
not done antitrust analysis necessary to conclude whether or not the antitrust laws would be violated

that

are

terri to.ries of
out in staff
be
.~~. ..... aa.Ho:.c"'

and in the

allocation of

each of those utilities
Just

the absence

a facile

Gas &

load

a merger, San

can

there is a merger and
think it's a fair guess that the
indifferent to that because,
so do we

care? But
that a
of
in the
can be run in the

a

a

has some spare

cities in N orthe:rn California

time.

all around the Western United

Edison has the

has the

then
our economy.

to

of resources and a net
So

:richness

the reserves, and

these bulk power transactions in the

each

the diversity of its own

of its own resources that needs

be

and sellers

And a merger that takes a look that reduces

these markets now.

one very substantial

And

has to be viewed with concern.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: What tools are available to the
the recent

there are not a

the

General to

Court decision?

unfair

MR. STRUMWASSER: In the Texaco case?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yeah.
MR. STRUMWASSER:

one less than there was a week ago.

Supreme Court that the California Antitrust Law, the C

We had

Act,

to mergers and the

Supreme Court ruled last week 4-3 that we were correct in that assumption and that we will be
seeing many of the same faces when Attorney General Van de Kamp seeks for immediate
on that.

But there is certainly the Clayton Act which is less robust, frankly, in California than it is

elsewhere because of a conflict among the various federal circuits about to enforce and how to
interpret the Clayton Act.

if it hears

There is certainly the antitrust, the obligation of both

the matter, and the PUC to consider and give substantial weight to any antitrust concerns that are
brought before it and the Attorney General is following the PUC proceedings with

and may

So both in the regulatory realm and, I think, eventually in the

well become involved with those.

judicial realm, if that became necessary, there would be remedies available.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Any further questions?

Thank you very much, panelists.

We will

now break for lunch. We will be back here and I will pound the gavel at 1:30, which we will have then
the afternoon panel of various interest groups. Thank you very much.

--LUNCH--

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Can you hear me now? No? One, two, three.

Okay.

Let me

mention again that we will close the hearing with an open-microphone session to take brief comments
from persons whose views were not represented by the panelists. Those wishing to speak at the openmicrophone session should place their name on the sign-up sheet which is available from the
Committee Sergeant there at the front.
At this point,

and two minutes before that time is up, I will

limit his or her remarks to no more than ten
caution you so that we can get

the entire

u.""'",wu.u..

We now have Panel 3 with persons-- the
members here?

I urge each witness to

like to alert each witness for our

see.

Brian

and Bill Nelson. All

on Various Interest groups.

Do we have six

Michael Shames, Steven Burton, William

David

We will

First one will be Brian Bilbray, First District -- oh, he's not here.

Next will be William

Shaffran, Deputy City Attorney of San Diego.
MR. WILLIAM SHAFFRAN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Is this on? Is this on now?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes.
MR. SHAFFRAN:

Thank you.

The San Diego

opportunity to address this committee on the subject of U
has

regarding

utility

mergers,

specifically

mergers

Attorney's Office appreciates this
Merger Mania and the concerns the
concerning San Diego Gas & Electric

Company.
The City of San Diego has two

or concerns with the

-51-

of SDG&E

The first

And
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contained in the
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of the conditions of
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then the

the

terminate the
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and the
SCE were successful in its

takeover of

convince the San
that SCE could
is

it

the Tucson merger, the
mergers.
The best
obtain

average rate m

will be the same as that in San

service

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Two minutes.
MR. SHAFFRAN:

Thank you.

that concern me abou

About the TEP merger, Tucson Electric
One

there are two

loss of extensive control to the Federal

and that scares

agree with the CPUC, but I never

with FERC.
the issue of acid rain.

care who becomes

acid rain. Tucson Electric has all these nice coal-fired
taken

and

have to convert or

in these

is

to have to

But if in fact acid rain is
scrubbers and so on, the cost is

horrendous. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much. Let me-- do you believe then that the City

franchise and charter give the power to disapprove a measure even if the PUC approves them?
MR. SHAFFRAN: Yes.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

I lost the members of the committee.

show

up. Brian Bilbray, Board of Supervisors, First District.
MR. BRIAN BILBRAY:

Mr. Chairman, first of all, I'd like to welcome you to the County of

San Diego and to our chambers. I appreciate you being able to utilize our facilities here.

We

do appreciate your taking the time to come down and hear about the concerns and the interest of the
people who live in the Southwest corner of this state where California

I would like to

out to you that I represent the First District of the County of San Diego which tends to be an area
that has a large concentration of low- and moderate-income people.

So my interest in this

from a constituent's point of view, may be less to the stockholders and much more to the ratepayers.
My constituents tend to get -- pay the rates more than receive the benefits of owning stock and that
may reflect in my testimony today.

The Board of Supervisors has come out in opposition to the

merger with Edison, basically on the contention that it would be bad for the ratepayers of this region
and that the long-term impacts on the region do not justify the activity.
First of all, let me stress, with that point, we're looking at three different scenarios that are
possible here:

One, the status quo; two, the Edison takeover; and three, the Tucson merger. Of the

different proposals before us, the Edison takeover looks like the most devastating to the com
at large, both from the ratepayers' point of view and from the community.

I think you've

heard the concerns that the Mayor voiced about San Diego should now -- should not and shall not be
allowed to become a suburb of Los Angeles or its utilities. And I think we stand very strongly on the
advantages of a major community like San Diego having that right. But beyond that, there are
issues.

One is, we're looking at a proposal that says that, in the next few years, Edison will be as

expensive as San Diego Gas & Electric where SDG&E has the possibility of continuing a reduction
while Edison has the opposite. The third scenario, Tucson shows that, while Edison today is at 8.6 per
kilowatt hour in expenditure -- I mean in cost -- Tucson is at 7, and Tucson has maintained that.
we have a concern about the acid-rain issue, the acid-rain issue in comparison to the problems
with Edison are

that the non-attainment

of Los Angeles and San

is a

major problem for the generation of power for the ratepayers here. And the impacts on air quality is
a major concern for the citizens here.
The San Diego Gas & Electric has worked very hard at importing or having very, very clean,
natural gas to be able to generate the electricity to avoid adverse air quality impacts.

There is a

very strong possibility that that natural gas, if a takeover was done by Edison, would be shipped up
north to fulfill their clean-air requirements in the Los Angeles Basin.

And I think we can all agree

there may be problems with acid rain. But compare -- but Los Angeles's contribution to the air basin
problems in the Los Angeles Basin is much more severe than the acid-rain contribution being made
Tucson Electric and that the regultory restrictions on the non-attainment counties are going to be
immense.
We have a problem with the fact that we're looking at three different proposals, Mr. Chairman.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank

very much.

Executive Director of

Michael

Consumers Action
Thank you for
the
summarize some

concern, there
thusfar.

has

The financial

consolidations and means

up a

utilities is a

consolidation movement

their monopoly powers.
I raised for the

And I guess the

to consider is whether this is what the

or, is the Legislature now faced

to continue to break down the

encourage the

been

over the last

answer to this question, but I think it's a
committee and the Legislature. Now

that the

to their loss of the natural monopoly,

can retain some, if not

which the

what the financial

an

voiced

and continue to
years. Now I don't know

that warrants further investigation by this

not confident it's going to be examined by the PUC in these

A second point, one raised

and I think it's an excellent point:

consideration of alternatives to the merger -- and this

cannot be overstated -- the Legislature

should take action in the next session to ensure that the net benefits demonstrated
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Is the

the utilities be

defined as net benefits over those that would inure through
power braking, et cetera.

such as

Without a finding of this net benefit

PUC could not allocate properly the

to

let's say, of the

have to look at what the alternatives would have

then the
How do

know

or, even how to treat the dilution of the

stock effect that was raised by Assemblywoman Moore. So I think that the standard has to be the net
benefits over the alternatives and not just look at net benefits overall.
in a very, in a very exhaustive and, I think, complete list of
consideration, you raised the question:
reductions to customers?

for

Should the merger proponents be

rate

I'm not sure, at least my reading of law, suggests that

not sure

can. I think the PUC is the final arbiter on that question. But I certainly would like to see the PUC
be compelled to grant some kind of rate reduction or ensure some kind of rate reduction in order for
a merger to be approved.
Now I'd like to touch on some of the concerns that I've listed in my prepared statement. There
were four concerns.

Hopefully, we have time for it today.

The

(inaudible)

of the CPUC

jurisdiction by FERC, the impact of the Edison merger on competition in this state, the need for
additional funding of CPUC auditors, and most importantly, a strengthening of the few statutes that
address the issues that have been raised by this merger.
On the first point, I think Professor Fellmeth has outlined our reasons for concern about the
FERC jurisdiction expansion, and it's in the PUC jurisdiction. And we agree with the City Attorney
that this is a great concern of ours.

But I don't share Commissioner Wilk's confidence that this

jurisdiction is not threatened. In fact, in the proposed decision on the Swiphole (?) case that was just
released on Friday, the PUC judge has acknowledged that there are real limits to PUC jurisdiction in
interstate

transactions

and

it's

one

that's

considered

in

this

decision.

So

I

think

that

Commissioner Wilk's confidence is somewhat misplaced.
Secondly, we're concerned about the impact of either merger upon the burgeoning
in the energy production industry. It is UCAN's

the record, that competition, if

will benefit large and small customers. We feel that the issues on this competition issue
have been

(?) by the Professor and by the Attorney General.

We do want to

reiterate our concerns about this.
that

been touched upon

if either merger is approved, the

CPUC will encounter accounting and cost allocation nightmares that could probably give migraines to
the best of auditors. We are very concerned that the CPUC auditing staff is not sufficiently funded
to effectively scrutinize the accounting machinations that will come about through these new merged
utilities. They are going to be unlike any of the other

concerns that we've seen in the past,

and we feel that the auditing staff of the CPUC may not have the experience and the funding to do
that job properly.
Our final concern is probably our greatest concern and it involves the existing statutes that
address the ability of holding companies to purchase power utilities.

Commissioner Wilk has alluded

to the very important questions that he raised in his directive on the interpretations of 852 and 854. I

-55-

be

that

concerned on
have
a merger

interest is

the Commission
standard of review.

earlier

this "no

no foul"

I
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think

to be
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I think the stakes involved here are far too

have made very clear. The
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are too
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like to raise in the time alloted concerns the

that will be held. I am confident that
and I share

don't believe the

the standard that is

standard in which the merger must

The final

Commissioner

administrative

will be held

Moore's concerns that these will not allow for a thorough evaluation of

the

of either the Edison or the Tucson mergers. And I would hope that you, the
will continue your

the

on

case and that he will make clear to the Commission your desire to have
of the

mergers.

recommended two weeks of

one of our

on this issue.

We feel two weeks is

committee will use

abilities to

clear to the Commission.
think that

about covers our

additional facts that I've
and I thank you for

would urge you to review my

over here

and some statements that

our concerns in the

statement for
not mentioned

session.

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much.
know if this was addressed or not because I had to go out

WRIGHT: I
make a phone call. In adc

your concerns in

to mergers, are you talking about

was San Diego Gas & Electric merging with Tucson or whether
with Edison?

it

San Diego Gas & Electric

Do you see them as two different situations since Tucson is a smaller company o:r

smaller utility than Southern California Edison is?
MR. SHAMES:

Both mergers present very profound and, I think, dangerous implications. They

both have to be looked at. And my statements here thusfar pertain to both mergers, Edison and TEP.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

And your basic criteria is

ratepayers? You're not interested even if

awash?
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that it is beneficial to the

MR. SHAMES:

No, I don't believe it should be approved if it's awash. I think it must be a net

benefit to ratepayers, yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

they prove net benefit

but

any of that kind of information down the line, say, five or ten years down the line?

cannot
Then where are

you coming from?
MR. SHAMES: Completely inadequate. I think the considerations, as I point out in my
statem

must be long-term as well as short-term.

promises; we

But they have to be clear.

accept, you know, maybe, may not.

We

There has to be some degree of certainty,

which is one of the reasons why I think we require very in-depth hearings before the PUC, none of
this expedited two-week hearing process.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Because the only thing I'm not familiar with is what kind of

service is being delivered here in San Diego. But if the service here in San Diego, even today, is not
what you would like it to be, and the merger proved to be more beneficial basically in service, not
necessarily in cost, where do you come from then?
MR. SHAMES:

I think that alludes back to my earlier statement which is that SDG&E must

show that this merger is an improvement over the alternative that it may have available to it.

For

example, we don't see yet why SDG&E could not contract with Tucson, for the purchase of Tucson's
power, to the access to Tucson's transmission network.

Why do they have to have a merger?

Why

can't they use the alternative of contracting or power pooling, which has been proved beneficial in
the past? I think that that's a showing that SDG&E's going to have to make in order for us to feel
comfortable that this merger is truly beneficial to the public.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

You think that contracting can be less costly than owning the

company yourself?
MR. SHAMES:

Absolutely, because, as pointed out before, through contracting, the open

market has access to reviewing the contracts, to making sure that the arrangements and the terms in
those contracts are, in

the best that the open market can provide.

And when you have a

merger, and you don't have clear contracts that have been bid upon, then there's no assurance that
there would not -- that that is the best deal, that the open market could not provide a better deal
than the

that Tucson and SDG&E has made.

We want it open to the market to

determine whether the transactions between the two utilities are, in fact, the most cost effective.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any other questions? Okay. Our next witness will be David Moore,
Business Manager/Financial Secretary of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local 465.
MR. DAVID MOORE: Is this mike on?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes.
MR. MOORE: Good afternoon, Chairman and Assembly Members. I welcome the opportunity to
participate in this hearing with regard to utility mergers in California.
Prior to the announcement to the public that SDG&E and Tucson was going to merge, I was
invited to --I had it laid out in front of me of what was going to take place, what their plans were --
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We all know

at this merger, I had to make a decision as to whether it would be
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members which

which has an excess amount of power and no customers-- SDG&E with no power and
excess number of customers-- on a
Southern Cal Edison who proposes to

it looks like a very
it

merger of both.

comes

same company which stated that it was a.-•ti-

competitive for SDG&E to go with Tucson. If that's anti-competitive, what of their takeover?
And again, looking at the overall picture and talking with the
union

it is a consensus that we would support, and continue to

Tucson and SDG&E and do

we can to block or

both non-union and
the merger of

the so-called merger or hostile

takeover which I believe is coming down the road with Southern Cal Edison.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Question, Assemblywoman?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You mentioned 80,000 were put out of jobs?
MR. MOORE: This was asserted, yes, between '86 .••
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: This is nationwide?
MR. MOORE: This is nationwide.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Over what time period?
MR. MOORE: May of, between May of '86 through '87, latter part of '87.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

When you, do you talk about, how much of this would have

probably been through attrition retirements?
MR. MOORE: Most of these figures are either reduced wages or cutbacks, mostly in layoffs.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Would you be opposed to a merger, say, if it was set up so that it
would be through a process of attrition? In other words, as people went into retirement, that's where
the cuts would be taken in personnel?
MR. MOORE:

Well, we're in what they call that right now, "attrition" or "downsizing". When I

took office in 1986, there were 2,005 employees I represented. That's normally half of the employees
of SDG&E. Today there's 1,975. We have done this through attrition, downsizing, so on and so forth.
I believe this is being done because of the upcoming battle they're going to have with these mergers.
The work is still there.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Why do think •••
MR. MOORE: When you say would I propose, you would have to get the whole picture and look
at it, what we're talking about.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: The other
think these-- what did he say, 1
MR. MOORE:

I would have: Where would, where would you

jobs would be eliminated?

what he claims it'd be.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

If you're

the same number of people, where would the

$1,000 come from?
MR. MOORE: 1,000 members?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Uh-huh.
MR. MOORE: 1,000 employees?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yeah.
MR. MOORE: I didn't make a statement. Howard Allen did.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: You did research to find out where they were coming from? I'm
kind of curious because I know that my daughter works for Von's Market. And when Von's Market was
in the process with Safeway, there was all this doom and gloom about all the ones who were going to

each one
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would
take a
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ASSEMBLYWOMAN
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of

to the

mark

or the goal, do you see

as a
that all utilities are

here.

this. And
when this stuff starts to come
non-maintenance program

hit hard.
calls. What I'm
We're not

The service to the customers
about is service that are

the maintena '.ce we did before. We

still are there when the customer
maintenance work. We're forestalling on it.
have the

to do it anymore. And

not
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
ent and there -- or are you

Are you
about

about maintenance only of the company's
some services to employer -- I mean, to

customers?
MR. MOORE:

Well, if you start-- if you cut back on maintenance, that's the less number of

you have to worry about
done

the work and you can sacrifice there.

contractors to take up some of the slack. But it's

There is work

off. The work is being put

off.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: In talking -- as you go along this line, I'm
you with that same line of questioning.

to come back to

But in putting this -- have you talked to the

of

Edison in Los Angeles at all -MR. MOORE: Yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

-- a..•d got some idea what they think were the 1,000 employees

have come from?
MR. MOORE: There are representatives from Edison here, if you would rather pose a question
to them. I'd rather have them speak for themselves. But I have talked with employees and also with
union members up there.

From what I gather, they're not in favor of the merger between Southern

Cal Edison and SDG&E neither. But they can speak for themselves. If you would have, want some of
my time ••.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I was trying to low ball that to you.
MR. MOORE: If they want some of my time, they can gladly have it right now.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

I'm still in the baseball season and you kind of missed the hit.

But why don't I go to Michael Shames on some of the same questions about the quality of service and
your concerns with what layoffs and what the merger will really do along those lines of service to
customers.
MR. SHAMES:

Thank you.

I'll be brief.

quality of service would be from the mergers.

We are concerned about what the impact upon the
SDG&E has been in a downsizing mode for the last

three years and continues to be so. It said it's going to be laying off through attrition 250 employees
over the next three years. We expect that to happen. It may even be larger.
The layoff suggested by Mr. Allen, our understanding was 1,000 employees through both
utilities, not just SDG&E.
certainly.

And it certainly does seem to be doable, given the goals of SDG&E,

In terms of the maintenance reductions, yes.

Through the downsizing, there has been a

reduction in the maintenance, particularly the transmission lines.
have been additional power outages as a result of this layoff.

And we're concerned that there

However, I'm not entirely sure that's

the result of the merger. My feeling is that that kind of downsizing is happening and ...
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Well, that's the trend of utilities everywhere. It's competition.
MR. SHAMES: Yeah. I'm not sure the merger's going to have that much of a greater impact.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Okay.

Steven Burton, speaking for the Independent Energy

Producers Association.
MR. STEVEN BURTON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Assembly members. I wear two hats. I'm a
Board Member for the California Independent Energy Producers; I'm also General Counsel to the
SITHE (?) Energies Group. One of the members of the SITHE Energies Group is energy factors which
is a San-Diego-based independent power producer. Our group produces power in 15 states.

We have

contracts with all three California utilities.
The other experience that I bring to this hearing, having served from 1977 to 1979 as General
Counsel to the California Air Resources Board, I'm somewhat familiar with the potential problem
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that came out of this merger was that we had more reasonable

to deal with-- and I can say that because we have contracts with Southern California Edison;
we have contracts with PG&E --I think it would be an

ent.

As far as competition itself is concerned, I don't believe that the merger with Edison will create
a

for competition. If this

able to bid for that power. If SDG&E

needs power, the PUC has a bidding process, will be
on its own,

bid for that power but we'll have a very

difficult time implementing contracts. The

from a competition point of view, I believe,

would be the Tucson merger because, once

a.15 a. . . . ,

SDG&E will love to do is have each QF

ect become a

a.."'ld forth between the two state commissions

lose the support of the California PUC. What
ball. And

that ultimately

try and bat it back

can go to FERC and stall

us for years at a time.

do our

That costs millions of dollars. It doesn't do consumers any

It

any good.

So

to you, as

is that you take a careful

be required if either of these mergers go through.

The California

at what it is that it
Court, I think, is very

willing to protect your authority, to protect the PUC's authority. The U.S. Supreme Court may not
be so willing to do that but it will look to a standard of reasonableness. And if there's legislation
place that has criteria by which a state utility can merge with a utility in another state that appears
is to the benefit of the citizens of that state, I think such legislation will have a

reasonable,

much better chance of standing up. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

There's one other member who has not yet

arrived, and we'll hear from Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Chamber of
Commerce of San Diego when he comes in in a few minutes because we're a little bit ahead of
schedule.
At this point, what I'd like to do is to go to the sign-up sheet and I'll just call the names out and
please come to the microphone and tell us why you think something should or shouldn't be done. Ray
Sanborne. We're a little bit ahead of schedule so that it gives them an opportunity to come in. Dean
Cofer. Ray Sanborne, Dean Cofer.
MR. RAY SANBORNE: Yes. At this point in the program, how much time do I have?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Well, if you don't repeat what's already been said, you can take

almost as much time as you need.
MR. SANBORNE: Oh, great. (Laughter)
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Because •••
MR. SANBORNE:

I don't have -- I don't think I'll be repeating too much that's

been

said.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Have you been here all day?
MR. SANBORNE: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:
MR. SANBORNE: I

to shed a

not been said or

of

focus for you some
that

been

of

first-hand

some of the

ar.d third hand. or as

CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay.
MR. SANBORNE:

And so in the area that you feel that I am treading in an area that you're

already up the speed on, I'd be happy to move on.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Okay. Identify yourselves and figure on five minutes and then
see if you need any more.
MR. SANBORNE: Okay. I'm Ray Sanborne and I'm the Business Manager/Financial Secretary of
Local 4 7 of the International Brotherhood of Electric Workers. I represent approximately 6,000 union
workers of the Southern California Edison Company. There are approximately 8,000 union workers on
the property of which the utility workers of America represent the other 2,000.
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is
States and how

careers and
in a very sad
for San
to

But let me say that

and to you,
handle this if you allow this

take
excess and

that

will

There's no-- you

the

the

deal with Edison on a

Edison has been-company.

allow them to form a
it was going to

was

for the

I want to tell you, it
the day, and I mean
have began to suffer
ow: workers with non-union, non-

workers. The

We have
documentation of the
have those subsidiares

a

The

out

intent of
to take waste heat

and we were

idea because that Laundromat out there

natural resources,
not be

to

that that

would have to

power. That was a

saw that there was a
and they

a

the PUHCA Law and in the FERC

company.

set themselves up with subsidiary

in
themselves a

are

are not m
waste heat

out of it and then

are

up to

sell themselves

that that will go up

150

of the
in the next 8 years.

use of waste heat
are making an

the PUC and

all of this power from ourselves at these exorbitant rates."
that's what it was.

that that utility
Edison

But

is one of the nation's
and

to then

"My God, we had to
say for themselves that

power in the State today and
got themselves a rate

increase of $384 million, 11.1 percent on the ratepayer, residential
C

bills in the State of

and that has all been passed off -- absolutely the classic case to use the

man that killed his parents and then
wrong with the

to the

for mercy because he's now an

The

is that the judge would have thrown him out of court but the PUC

passed on the $384 million to the ratepayers. What will
San Diego Gas? What can we expect?
can then

of the

if they are allowed to now

with

We can expect a much larger base of customers which

their cogeneration through Mission Energy and pass those same unregulated
of San

to the

What about the humane treatment of employees that Edison has promised to the people of
San Diego? I submit to you that the proof again is right in the pudding. They will not be humane to
those people.

Why would they be?

They're not humane to the people that we

and the

that have worked with them for 30 years. The people that they write, and they write regularly
and say, "You have made this company what you are. We appreciate your efforts. Without you, we
would not be what we are today."

But those same people, since they've got their holding place, we

have gone through one reduction of one department after another. And people have gone back to the
very jobs that they started in for Edison 30 years ago, clear back to the bottom. And you know who's
doing their work? People in other departments on overtime, contractors that they're bringing in that
are not qualified, which are causing power outages, which we are then having to fix for the
contractor, which is not being billed, back-billed to the contractor that did the shoddy work.

It is

being charged against Edison's overhead. There's a real close examination of the problems here that
needs to be looked at.

You have a merger with Tucson which has excess power.

You have an

economy out there that can use the power to sell to -- and a community here that needs it. We
have that criteria. It's already been spoken to by a number of people. Those criteria do not fit the
Edison, San Diego thing.

The only thing that fits, and the only thing that drives the push to merge

with San Diego is a key phrase: "The nation's largest utility company". You have a megamanic that
is running the Southern C
not care about employees.

Edison Company
I

He is a profit-oriented individual. He does

you to show me a

example of where he has done anything

humane for the employees of the Southern California Edison Company in the last three years.
wants to make a name for himself.

He wants to build the

your papers: Will the PUC be able to effectively regulate Edison?
cannot effectively regulate Edison.

empire in the State.

He

You ask in

And I submit to you they will not.

They don't know what's going on in Edison.

They

cannot possibly know.
Look at the San Inofre (?)
paper work north for the PUC to

that we had sometime ago where they ship trainloads of
and go

and make a determination about whether or not

certain things should be allowed in a rate base.
paper work that they generated.

Nobody could humanly comprehend that volume of

And the problems with the contractors, the subsidies to the

contractors, the overtime that they spend, they force people to work under threat of termination at
year's end to get the budget

so that they can

the same

plus more the following year.

The overhauls, the repairs of the same facilities, two and three times in a one- and two-year period
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the same service center.

tell you that Edison
the

now deserves closer scrutiny
ever had in recent years.

ROSENTHAL:
Yes.
MOORE: I

now.

SANBORNE: I'm sorry.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
to talk

that you don't see any

gone on at some

me

you

now repeating yourself.

of

service

the

which goes to an issue
service.

and

One, you continue

of Edison. In

raised

and

you

to the

about the quality of

that you have concrete evidence that Edison has not maintained a

standard of service and in fact has

outside contractors that are providing shoddy work

which is then corrected

and that there is no trace of this. I'm kind of

interested in that because
are

is accurate. And

MR. SANBORNE:

The PUC,

concerned about it. Your
and has

which they should not bear if what

it means a cost to

this at all.

the PUC has
at a PUC

last week.

as a matter of

They did not seem to be
has shown more interest in

Ms.

more attention than anyone else in the state as to trying to determine what's going

on in that
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I kind of asked
MR. SANBORNE:

a little bit about it but that's okay.

sorry. What would you like me to explain again?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
you consider

to

was

to understand a little bit. Give me an example

work

up

employees that's been contracted out and

come back and correct. Give me some idea of what
MR. SANBORNE:
come into a

contractors that come in --

are loaned Edison
are not

about.

take the whole field. Contractors that

are loaned Edison supervision to the supervisor crews

to

the contractors that come in in the middle of

and do not have the necessary tools or materials to do the job and they are giving them out of
Edison stock. All of that is

the Edison crews and is being made to make the

Edison worker look less productive and less efficient and the contractors more efficient.

That

on a daily basis.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:

Well, do

bid the contract with the understanding that

going to provide the tools and the workers -MR. SANBORNE: Certainly.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: -- and the supervisors?
MR. SANBORNE:

They bid a job at a price to complete it but then they don't do it that way

and they are supplemented by it, yes, and we've provided documentation on that.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I'd like to see some of that documentation again, I guess, and I'd

like to maybe pursue this a little further.
MR. SANBORNE: Sure.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Because I think that there

is

be another hearing at which time the utilities can make their case and it's

to have to

kind of hard.

like

to hear from Edison and SDG&E and some of the others on this.
MR. SANBORNE: Sure.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Assemblywoman Wright?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

Maybe I'm picking up on something that Gwen said but I was

thinking in a different vein. You know, you keep making, making charges.
MR. SANBORNE: Yes.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And that's fine.
MR. SANBORNE: Fine.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

But when it comes to a point of a decision being made as to

whether anyone is going to be reprimanded, punished, or fined, or whatever, you've got to have the
documentation. You would have to have copies of contracts that show exactly what they contracted
for. Do they contract for just labor? Do they contract for labor and supervisors? Do they contract
for labor, supervisors, and equipment? Those are the things you have to have and-MR. SANBORNE: We have that.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: -- then you would have to be able to track it through and see if,
indeed,

what you're saying is that

the Edison employee

was being

charged, basically,

with

incompetence because of something that was done by the hired, or contracted labor. And that's what
you've got to have because you can stand here and say to us all you want. But if you want anything to
go into a court to make a determination, whether you have the Legislature as that court requesting
additional legislation or whether you're going to an actual court in the judiciary system to ask for
for it.

You're

to have to have the documentation and you're going to have to

have the documentation
MR. SANBORNE:

over a long period of time.
I understand that and we have that documentation and we have provided

much of that documentation.
ASSEMBYLWOMAN MOORE:
would be interested in

Mrs.

does that mean if he has that documentation, you

it?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Yes, I would, because there's so many times that we sit here-ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: I understand that.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

-- and we have concern for what people are saying.

But then

when it comes down to have it documented where you can really go to bat with it, you don't have it.
And you've got to have that.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: And I think ••.
MR. SANBORNE: No, I take strong exception to that. I do have it. I'm telling you I have it.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: I haven't seen it. I'm hearing you for the first time.
MR. SANBORNE: And I'm telling you I would be willing to provide it to you.

- 67-

not

to you but I think that at the next
:removed from the

when Edison and when the gag

SDG&E

WRIGHT: Edison.
MOORE:

that other one?

ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE: Southern California Edison when
kind

documentation because

can talk. We need to have

when we talk about benefits-- you heard a little bit

about the trickle-down
MR. SANBORNE: Um-hmm.
ASSEMBLWOMAN MOORE: And we wa..""It to know a little bit about what's going to happen with
the
it trickles. And if it's not •••
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: If it
But at any rate -- and I think that at that time it'd be

MOORE: Or

for whatever kind of information that you have to make that available, and I'll
make sure that you're very high up on the program because I think those are the kinds of concrete
kinds of

that need to be reviewed in

with the workers from the individual
California and all of us,

to make a decision because we're concerned, not
but what the implications are for the ratepayer of

to our

persuasion, want the best for the people in

alifornia and what's in the best interest in the

for everyone.

ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And done efficiently.
MR. SANBORNE: Pardon?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And done efficiently.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN MOORE:
MR. SANBORNE: Yes.
not to talk

about this

correct.
two other points that I think -- again, I understand this hearing

ect but

at least have your appetite whetted on.

two other very critical points that I think you need to
And one is, what is happening under the cogeneration as

Edison is running it through their Mission Energy subsidiary? I doubt that you even have any idea of
the amount of paid-for generation around the Edison system that is now being mothballed and the
number of good Edison jobs that are being lost as a result of them, in effect, transferring regulated
generation to their non-regu. ated subsidiaries so that they can sell it back to themselves and then
pass that price on with a market to the ratepayers. The number of megawatts in the Edison system,
which are sitting out there, more efficient, say, better use of the natural resources and more cost
effective for the ratepayers that is sitting out there mothballed today because they have that
unregulated subsidiary would shock you. And something needs to be done about that and certainly, I
am at a very low level in this society to try and change it and I understand some of the changes that
we're needing is at a federal level. But certainly, you people are in a position to help look into that
and bring pressure to bear on Washington to change those and that needs to be done.
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The other thing that I think that you need to be aware of, and I'm not here to directly talk about
our particular fight with Edison on any given issue, but you need to understand that if a
is involved here, a company that is bragging to anyone that will

and

even

about making all-time record profits while at the same time demanding all-time rf'cord
takeaways from their employees, there is something wrong with that.

That is bad public policy, I

believe. And I certainly submit to you that, if they are doing it to their existing employees who have
made the company what they are today, there is no reason whatsoever to believe that they're going to
do anything better for San Diego's employees and their citizens if they take over this utility.

And

that concludes my remarks and thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you, Mr. Sanborne. (Applause)
We had one other person who was on the other panel who has just come in.

And I'm

to

offer Mr. Bill Nelson, Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce of greater San Diego, an opportunity
to make his presentation.
MR. BILL NELSON: Thank you, Senator Rosenthal.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Is the mike on? Is the mike on?
MR. NELSON: Does this work better, you think? I'm sorry. I did want to offer my apologies to
you.

We at the Chamber annually have an enlisted Recognition Day here in San Diego.

It's very

important to San Diego since one out of every six people in the United States Navy serves in this
community.

We really appreciate them and we've been fortunate enough to have Ambassador

Jean Kirkpatrick speak to us.

And I do want to offer my apologies.

But in behalf of the Chamber,

and I have given you a written statement but I wish to stress it, now the Greater San Diego Chamber
of Commerce opposes the attempt by Southern California Edison to acquire San Diego Gas & Electric
and assume its service territory.

The Chamber's position is not based on any antipathy toward

Southern California Edison nor a belief that it's not a good utility. On the contrary, our investigation
leads to the conclusion that it's an excellent operation serving its territory well and providing rewards
and incentives to its employees and stockholders.
Now I should also say, particularly at this point, this is not only a rare event for the
it's totally unique. The Chamber allows, or does not get ourselves involved, with corporate takeovers.
We've lost PSA; we've lost companies such as IVAC (?) and others, those who do not, we believe, serve
as an appropriate vehicle for Chamber of Commerce concern.

In this particular

the

Chamber took the view that we believe we must think of the community benefit rather than, but not
derogation, of the narrow interests of the ratepayer and the stockholders, and employees. These are
extremely important and must not be ignored in any final resolution.

I'm sure you're not going to

ignore them, as well as not going to ignore the total statewide interest.

I'm very frankly speaking

specifically for San Diego and the San Diego community.
We became convinced, after our investigation, that the greater community good would be best
served by allowing a proven management in place to respond to the challenges of San Diego and to
pursue the strategy they have already formulated to serve this area.

The proposed merger would

create the biggest public utility in the United States, at least until it encourages other mega-
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mergers.

But would big be better?

its

However much it may help SCE to find a high-growth area to
on the

capacity, it would be

of the attention of the

combination would grab a

authorities and it would stifle innovation.

In the

industry, the new ideas and services
a

of companies across various territories.

emulation with others that
are instructive. The

Their successes prompt

have good

Errors are also rapidly disseminated and

wealth of this new

would dominate the utility industry. It would

have no incentive to innovate or to accommodate new ideas.

can govern and control

excess but it cannot stimulate. We've face the prospect differences which are not meaningful in an
atmosphere of zero risk, zero gain.
Let me also take this opportunity to point out that the management of San Diego Gas &
Electric over the last few years has been

in the true sense of that word. They've honestly

admitted their errors, intelligently faced their

and have produced a powerful strategy to

not only meet the problems but to position themselves for decades for better service for this
community. Obviously, this is good in a direct sense; less obviously, it's GREAT as an example to all
our other businesses. During many years, San Diego Gas & Electric has been a willing contributor of

' to a new level
executive talent to our community efforts. Their latest efforts raise this contribution
of exemplary conduct.
Again, while we salute SCE for their ability, we also thank them for pointing out what a
powerful management team Mr. Page has built. And I wish to thank you again for your attention.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you very much.

We will now go back to the open

microphone. Dean Cofer?
MR. DEAN COFER:

Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee, my name is Dean Cofer. I'm

with the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local 4 7, which is the Local that represents
the

at the Southern California Edison
One brief remark, I want to point out that over 100 working men and women from the Edison

Company took a day off without pay today to be outside this building picketing to show their disfavor
and distrust of the California-- Southern California-- Edison Company.

With that, I'd like to

withdraw my name and Mr. Stewart's (?) name which is the next speaker. Thank you very much.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Well, Mister-- thank you very much, Mr. Cofer. Tli"en Mr. Stewart
(?) will not be speaking?

MR. COFER: That's col rect.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Kimberly Bitterness (?)? John Chavot, C-h-a-vo-t?
MR. BERNARDO GARCIA: Mr. Chavot is withdrawing his name as well.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Withdrawing his name. All right.
MR. GARCIA: I think I follow him.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Bernardo Garcia?
MR. GARCIA:

Correct. I've prepared a written statement that I'd like to submit. I have the

original and about 10 or 15 copies.
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CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Give them to the sergeant, please.

And

us the--

it, if you will.
MR. GARCIA:

Well, I think the written statement

for

so

like to make a

oral comments.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you.
MR. GARCIA: First of all, I'd like to thank the Committee for providing me an
speak here today.

As I stated, my name is Bernardo Garcia.

I'm the Business Agent for U

Workers Union of America, Local 246.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Are you here to represent the 2,000 workers

(inaudible)

?

MR. GARCIA: Correct. We represent the Southern California Edison employees in the Steam
Generation Divisions and Nuclear Operations. I think we represent a unique interest
employee representative, stockholder, as well as ratepayers.
and I'll give you a specific example:

that of an

Our main concern is the loss of jobs,

Southern California Edison Company, Howard P.

has

publicly announced that he will cut 1,000 jobs if the SCE/SDG&E merger is approved and claims this
will lower electric rates.
We believe that any rate reductions would be negligible as employee costs are a small
percentage of electric rates. During the last two years, SCE has reduced the number of jobs overall
yet has failed to realize a rate reduction.

SCE rates have actually increased three times this year.

We do not feel this is in the best interests of the ratepayers because these perceived rate reductions
will not endure the test of time. As utilities diversify and grow, we should take a closer look at their
non-regulated as well as regulated activities. Big is not necessarily better.
SCE has proven this.
employee benefits.

They have cut jobs, diversified, and are currently attempting to cut

Yet it failed to realize a corresponding reduction in rates.

The legislator -- -

lature -- excuse me -- should investigate these areas further and enact legislation that addresses the
concerns raised here today.

The PUC has allowed SCE's subsidiary power sales to grow unchecked

and at a substantial cost to the ratepayers, illustrated by the recent 11 percent rate increase. Should
these mergers be allowed to
position of being

without further investigation?

We'll find ourselves in

to undue a monopoly which could be the

of this

in

the nation.
I urge you to hold additional hearings at additional locations to provide all the

an

opportunity to present their views. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. Garcia. (Applause) Gary Estes?
MR. GARY ESTES: Good afternoon. Can you hear me? Is this thing on?
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Yes.
MR. ESTES:

Cannot tell from where I am.

My name is Gary Estes and what I'd like to do is

basically two things, is, one, let you know what my bias is, 'cause we all have a bias, and so
clear to you, and then what our interest is in utility mergers.
I work for a company called Hunter Industries and we're located in North San Diego County in
the City of San Marcos.

And at Hunter Industries, we manufacture landscape sprinklers by
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a

410 employees, and our annual

."'""'"'"'... "' process. And we
would be somewhere around

sales in

the world.

Hunter

over a

million.

Founded in

1, our products are sold

concerns with gas a>J.d electric rates come from the fact

of a million dollars on electric and gas to

which is rated at 690

our

We have a

about my company.

And a little bit about my background, I've been involved with utility issues since 1976 when I
in the Virginia State Office of the Attorney General in the Division of Consumer
ouncil. Our
U

mandate for that division was to

the interest of consumers before

Regulatory Commission known as the State Corporation Commission.

Well, after two and a half years with the Attorney General's Office, my wife and I moved to San
And since 1979, I have been involved with San Diego Gas & Electric in utility issues. In 1981,
I represented the United Federation of Small Business before the PUC in SDG&E's 1982 general rate
case.

And in that proceeding, we dealt

with rate

issues as they impact small

business.
In

, I founded the San Diego Cogeneration Users Group. The Cogeneration Users Group is
of the end owners and users of cogeneration systems.

reasons:

And the group was formed for two

One, to share practical information about the design, operation, and maintenance of

cogeneration systems, the nuts and bolts of

and also to keep up with the regulatory PUC

legislative FERC activity which goes on which impacts the economics of cogeneration systems. And
this group continues today to be a link between the end users to maintain this awareness amongst
them.
The Cogeneration Users Group was a foundation for the creation of another group called the
San

Energy Alliance. The

Alliance was formed in 1985 and we are affiliated with the

California Manufacturers Association. The Energy Alliance is composed of members of the CMA and
non-members of the CMA who

the

before the PUC. In 1985, we put together the first

representation of a diverse group of San Diego businesses before the PUC because the
continued increase of electric rates for commerical and industrial customers as compared to
residential customers were just out of control. In that case, which was the 1986 general rate case,
the PUC heard us and we saw some signficant reductions in the increases to commercial and
industrial customers.

And since 1985, I have served as Executive Director of the San Diego Energy

Alliance.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTH; L: Mr. Estes-MR. ESTES: Yes.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: -- would you tell us, get to the point of -MR. ESTES: Okay, sir.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

-- how you think the subject of this hearing, merger, affects what

you're talking about.
MR. ESTES: I'd be glad to, sir. The concern that we have is end energy users, is that no matter
which merger occurs, what we are seeing is a change in the marketplace. We see gas companies not
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out to be competitive. And the experience we've had with San Diego Gas & Electric is that we
it's time that, no matter which merger may go through, is that the Gas Department of the U
must be separated from the electric side.

The gas side needs to be a

independent,

corporation with an interest of selling natural gas not having the Gas Department as the
the Electric Department.
Our experience in San Diego was that the Gas Department can only do what the Electric
Department tells them they can do.

And there truly is competition between electric,

an energy source and natural gas as an energy source. San Diego is the only major utility in the
of California with the need for generation capacity.

And last year, they put an outrageous effort

upon to kill existing and future cogeneration systems in San Diego County when they could have had
small businesses put up their own money, put up their own risk capital to put it in this
facilities and SDG&E tried to destroy those who had already made those investments and prohibit the
people who wanted to put in systems. And the way they do that is with their rates, and the concern
we have is they'll play around with their gas prices to try to help their Electric Department. And no
matter which merger occurs, I think as a matter of public policy, they should have to divest
themselves in the natural gas portion from the electric side, either sell it to SoCal Gas or have,
sell it off to another set of investors. And so that's our basic concern for the issue you have before
you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much.
MR. ESTES: Thank you.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Any questions?
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: Let me ask one question.
MR. ESTES: Yes, ma'am.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

I didn't have a chance to say anything to the gentleman who

represented the Chamber of Commerce. But you heard from the independent producers'
you were in the audience at the time.
MR. ESTES: Yes, ma'am, I was.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT: And he was really down on San Diego.
MR. ESTES: Yes, they've been very uncooperative for cogeneration.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:
the San Diego Gas & Electric.

And yet you have the Chamber of Commerce in full

And to me, if I'm hearing correctly, you're more siding with the

independent producers and that you're saying there is the problem where you have one company with
both energies involved?
MR. ESTES: There is. There is a problem when you have one utility control both the gas and
electric.
ASSEMBLYWOMAN WRIGHT:

You think that's what's happening right now with San

Gas & Electric?
MR. ESTES:

Yes, it's interesting that SDG&E, they'll go out and promote gas air

when SoCal Gas will go out and promote cogeneration. So it's a difference of focus and we think it's
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important that those energy sources be separate so you can have, truly have competition to get to the
cheapest cost of electricity by people who can cogenerate because they're 70 percent efficient,
where the utility is only 35 percent efficient when you convert those energy resources to electricity.
So still in this nation, we have to have energy conservation and that's why a reasonable person, I
think, can see that cogeneration is at 70 percent is better than at 35 percent when a utility does it.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL: Thank you very much, Mr. Estes.
MR. ESTES: Thank you for your time.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

That concludes the list. Does anybody feel a strong desire to give

us another minute? Please come forward. Introduce yourself.
MR. DON KLEIN:

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

My name is Don Klein and I represent

Ratewatchers. We're an advocacy group here in San Diego. I wasn't going to make any remarks today
but I just feel compelled to do this, particularly because in your opening remarks, Mr. Chairman, you
asked us if the laws and regulations were sufficient on the books today to handle this situation.

The

expert panels have given us some, some direction in that area. And I'm not an attorney but I do have
a strong background in regulatory matters with the airlines.
During that time, the Public Utilities Commission did regulate the airlines and so during that
time we also, the Commission was also involved with the federal and the state.

And that is a

possibility that may occur here in the event that Tucson occurs. We certainly, the Public Utilities
Commission, certainly does not want to lose any of its strength. And one of the problems now is that
it has no strength. There is no enforcement branch to the Public Utilities Commission. They cannot
find people; they cannot issue orders to cease and desist practices.

You've heard testimony today

from the local labor people who were saying maintenance has been deferred, set aside; it allows to
continue.

The only thing the Public Utilities Commission can take testimony on these things after

the fact, and many times, a year or more after the fact; in some cases, three years after the fact in
general rate cases. And by that time, the damage is done; the operators have gone on to do whatever
else they can do and compound their errors.

And I certainly don't have the answer to this.

But I

suggest that if you want to put some teeth into these problems that you've heard here and elsewhere
in other meetings-- and I've heard them many, many times, boringly, many, many times when they're
not completed-- you must give enforcement to the Public Utilities Commission so that they can
enforce the laws that are on the books and not wait for three years.
CHAIRMAN ROSENTHAL:

Thank you, sir.

Anyone else feel compelled?

Yes, please come

forward. Tell us -- give us yc ur name for the record.
MR. JERRY LEE PENDER:

My name is Jerry Lee Pender and I'm here to speak just as a

consumer of electricity. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman and Ladies and Gentlemen of the panels. I've
been a resident here in San Diego for about 20 years; and much of that time, I've paid Southern
Gas & Electric money for their services.

I've heard much about this merger between Edison and

San Diego Gas & Electric. It is a concern of mine only because I live in California and I have, have to
pay for electricity and gas.

The merging of the companies, et cetera, is not new.

But this one

between these two power suppliers could become a big headache for me as well as my children and
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their children, on down the line.
I don't think many of us have read between the line, the

of this merger.

was all

you said

in

if not them, their

be here to

I

there's

no, no, let me rephrase that because in
their stock to earn dividends. The

I

comes

of energy would like to make

are real. This is the real world.
someone say

if San

Gas & Electric needs a hundred

would

it from some western supplier. Well, this energy will sooner or later have to be

whom will this have to be paid-- I'm sorry.

And by whom will have to pay this profit

these two companies, to me, will create similar to a
Take a question:

a

To

of service.

If mom and pop are the only service providers, what

to me as a

consumer? I'll tell you. I'll probably get the shock treatment.
As our resources go down, the demand gets greater, the bills keep increasing. What happens to
the low-income families, et cetera? I think we see the plight of the homeless already as

the

People are working twice as hard and long because of inflation. These are
times.

We must make a prudent effort in having the decisions handled between this merger

What we decide what this merger will affect consumers for years and years on down the line, not
California but in the nation. I mean nuclear plants will have to be built, not to overly cost

or

poor design. Every rate increase seems to make my pockets or my savings decrease.
In

I would like to say competition is okay and merging is okay. But when you live in an

environment where energy is for sale, the price tag can be very high. I remember as a
home with no power, no electrical lights, and no gas.

That was then and this is now.

I

If you live

within the city limits or in a county, then you must have a power hookup to a utility company.
I say it is time for us to go

Thank you very
to be very

are
to hear f:tom the

at some
And

very

--oOo---

in
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s
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San Diego, California
I am pleased to have been invited to appear before you
to discuss public policy concerns with regard to mergers and
acquisitions in the.electric utility industry.
I should start by noting that consolidation by merger
and acquisition was rather common during the earlier history of
the electric utility industry.

However, until quite recently,

there has been very little such activity for approximately the
last quarter century.

The first wave of mergers and

acquisitions resulted in the consolidation of many essentially
local operations into the large electric public utility holding
companies of the 1920s a

1930s.

Public Utility Holding

any Act o

through a lengt

period

(including divestitures,

f

ter t
19

ubs

reorganization

passage of the
the industry went
uct ring
rgers and

acquisitions) as a result of efforts to con orm to the dictates
of that legislation.
That period of restructu ing left us with an industry
of approximately 230 investor-owned elect ic (or combination
electric and gas) companies, most of whi

are substantial,

vertically integrated companies, each providing generation,
transmission, and distribution service within its service
area.

These investor-owned electric utilities co-exist with a

-

much larger number of publicly owned systems.
That is basically the way things have been for the
last 25 years or so.

During that period, however, major

changes occurred in the way the industry operates.

These

changes resulted from the desire to achieve efficiency and
economies in the cost of rendering service and improving the
quality of service, primarily by increasing reliability.
Rather than seeking to achieve these goals by industry
consolidation, the industry followed a different approach: a
strategy of industry cooperation through such means as the
formation of power pools, the utilization of multi-company
dispatch, participation in jointly owned generating units,
coordination agreements, and greater use of economy energy
transactions.
During the last two or three years, many experts have
predicted that the industry will undergo a substantial
restructuring.
that,

Some in the financial community have reasoned

in view of the good cash flow which many electric

utilities presently generate, outside investors will find it
attractive to acqLire control of a utility's common stock in a
leveraged transaction at a price in excess of the stock's
market and book value.

Consequently, they have projected a

wave of leveraged buyouts in the industry.
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On the other hand, many economi t

c

a

t

a

basic restructuring of the industry must occur because of the
competitive environment which utilities now face in generation
of electricity.

These economists believe that

pressure will cause a breakup of vertical

is compe

tive

integrated

structures and a wave of reorganizations (including
divestitures, mergers and acquisitions) as the industry evolves
toward what they view as a more efficient structure.
Views differ, however, as to whether such a
restructured industry will consist of far fewer major companies
(vertically integrated or not) or of an amalgam of (1) a great
many more large and small competitors providing generation,

(2)

a few large transmission companies which serve, at least in
part, as common carriers, and (3) a greater number of smaller
distribution entities which will be customers of both t
generation and transmission companies.
How has reality coincided with these predictions in
recent months?
1.

We have not seen the pr

c

wave o

leveraged

buyouts and tender offe s f om industry outsiders
or from utility management in conjunction with
industry outsiders.

There have only

such cases of any magnitude.

The f

three
rst is the

Alamito Company case, in which a utility had
earlier spun off ce tain generating assets which
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then became the object of a bidding war in a
leveraged tender offer.

In a second case, a

substantial shareholder of NECO Enterprises, the
holding company for Newport Electric, launched
two unsuccessful tender offers for a majority of
the Company's common stock and then later
successfully acquired in excess of 50% of the
common stock in open market transactions.

The

shareholder's reported objective was to obtain
control of the company in order to spin off
certain real estate assets which were believed to
have a higher value for development purposes.
In the third case, Public Service Company of
Indiana was approached by a group of outside
investors.

This group withdrew when the

management and board of PSI indicated that they
would oppose the investor group.
2.

Municipal Takeovers.
A second type of acquisition which has been in
the news has been the possibility of municipal
takeovers of portions of a utility's business.
These have generally been motivated by high rates
due to recent rate basing of large nuclear
investments and the current availability in some
parts of the country of abundant generating
capacity.

Certain municipalities are
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invest

a 1 of

at ng the possibili

a utili

's facilities within t

aries of

the municipality and perhaps some of the
utility's generating and transmission capacity,
but not all of the generating capaci
especially not the nuclear capacity.

The City of

Chicago and the City of New Orleans are
apparently considering such proposals.

Whether

we will actually see transactions of this type is
open to question.

A significant concern is that

the current availability of abundant generating
capacity for bulk power purchases may not
continue into the future.
3.

Scattered Systems AcgJLisition.
A third type of merger and acquisition
transaction in the utility industry is probab
germane only to the remaining smaller investorelectric uti ities, o
still a few.

A company

iss

formerly known

which there are

ike Utilicorp United,
r

blic Service

Company, has been acquiring scattered sma ler
electric utility systems

n the United States and

Canada.

repl cation of what has

This is really

been going on for some time

n the wa e

and

sewer utility industry and in the independent
telephone industry.
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We have also seen similar

acquisitions in the natural gas industry, for
example by Arkla.

While, because of the

scattered nature of the systems involved, one
cannot expect much in the way of operational
efficiencies due to system integration, such
transactions do have the potential to bring to
small systems more sophisticated management;
better technical know-how; the benefits of volume
purchasing on a centralized basis; better
engineering and planning processes; savings due
to centralized accounting, data processing, and
the like; and savings in cost of capital due to
ease of marketing larger securities issues for a
larger organization.
4.

Industry Consolidation.
The fourth type of merger and acquisition
transaction, and the one which is probably of
most interest to these Committees, is the
transaction which results in consolidation of
substantial electric utility companies.

It is

here that we have seen most of the recent
action.

We have had in recent times the

formation of Centerior, the holding company for
Cleveland Electric Illuminating and Toledo
Edison; the Southern Company acquisition of
Savannah Electric; the Utah Power & Light -
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Pacif

r~

merger proposal·

of

1

Nantahela by Duke Power; the recent proposal for
a merger of Central Maine and Central Vermont, in
conjunction with an acquisition of the
non-nuclear assets of Pu lie Service

any

f

New Hampshire, which is currently in Chapter 11
reorganization proceedings; and

two propos

s

affecting this city, the San Diego Gas &
Electric-Tucson Electric proposal and the SCE
Corp.-San Diego Gas & Electric proposal.
Justification for such proposed industry
consolidations include a variety of perceived
benefits.

Generally, improved management

sophistication is not an issue, since such large
utilities do not differ markedly in the level of
management sophistication.

However,

administrative and general cost savings, as well
as customer cost savings,

re of en cited.

such savings may,

be possible, they are

likely

in fact,

o be on a very

to the tota

l

of e ect ic

sea e whe
t

While

compared

costs, wh ch

1

include costs of enormous magnitude, such as fuel
costs, maintenance costs and capita
primary area

f

paten i

1 s

t

costs.
al

savings is operational efficiencies.
efficiencies could resul
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from system

t

Such

The

integration; load diversity (winter peaking
versus summer peaking and different on-peak
hours); diversity of customer mix {a company with
a heavy industrial load versus one with a heavy
residential or agricultural load - combination of
such diverse customer mixes can result in
improved earnings stability, which in the long
run will improve financial integrity and
consequently reduce costs of capital); relative
power plant efficiencies; relative long-run fuel
costs and fuel access; diversity of fuel mix;
improved economic dispatch; reduction in
maintenance costs (particularly with regard to
power plants); and the possibility of retirement
and liquidation of surplus assets and deferral of
capital expenditures.
These areas should be carefully reviewed by regulators
who are faced with a proposed industry consolidation in order
to determine the long run benefits of such a transaction.
One important point to note is that such savings may
be possible by implementation of alternatives to a merger or
acquisition, such as the previously mentioned realization of
economies through cooperative efforts in increased power
pooling, multi-company economic dispatch,

jointly owned

generating units, coordination agreements, and the like.
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1

at

that the res lting enter

necessi

nings stabili

e

be

, .

becau e

I

owe

will in turn assure
I

a

wh ch

).

ong

ca

t

invest

abl

such efficiencies as may exist are general

financial in

an overall concern about the extent to

ich short-term financia

r

ef ici

ng- e

econom c

ing more

h n book

oday in our economy to the exclusion of
efficiencies.
a

f

r

improved

Ra her

managerial, operational, or economic efficienci s.

confess t

to

s

Such transactions do not ordinarily bring to t

I

to

would add a note of caution here with reg a

oposed acquisitions

ature.

ng-term

e of

s e s

J.l

the long-run financ a

secur

a

e

Such investors will be p

he a sets o

11 have more dolla s invested whic

also desire to accomplish a
ir equ

inves

utili

stocks.

The

mus
ighe

ea n

r

ra e of re

n on

Ot

t

n

ive
t

increa e leverage.

ir

re y f

om hig

Its

ly
proac

- er

ower sho

t

r

a ring some of the
leverage necessarily
i

defini io

l

'

is

t

i

he

ee

lt of

leverage).

Since the business risk in a company is not likely

to change as a result of such a transaction, the company's
total risk (which is equivalent to its financial risk plus its
business risk) must increase.

Consequently, in the long-run,

cost of capital is likely to increase, resulting in higher
long-term rates to ratepayers.

Except in the case of a utility

which is in relatively serious financial difficulties, or in
certain voluntary corporate divestitures of utility assets, I

'

confess to some skepticism regarding the long-term benefits of
such transactions.
A few words about the current regulatory structure as
it applies to mergers and acquisitions in the electric utility
industry.

Applicable regulation at the federal level includes

the Securities and Exchange Commission under the Public
Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and
the Department of Justice's Antitrust Division.

Each of these

agencies may have jurisdiction, depending on the nature of the
transaction.

The Antitrust Division will focus on the

competitive aspects of a horizontal merger.

The NRC will focus

on the financial and managerial competence of the resulting
company in relation to nuclear power plants.

The SEC and FERC

will basically look at the various public interest
considerations which may be affected by the transaction.

I

will not take the time at this juncture to review in detail the
regulatory functions of these federal agencies.
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I know that

ill be

h r

e

ke t

I would, howeve

a ors.

iscuss the role of state
relev
f

a

to the acquis t

sions
i

e

The

om state to sta

ta

tes

re

those sweeping statutes that prohibit any acquisition of
ntrol of a public ut

t

a e

regulatory agency, such as exists

n Ca ifornia.

General

under such statutes, the state regulators, in considering a
proposed transaction, will look to public interest
considerations.

This has been variously interpreted in the
state regu ators.

cases which have been consider

Among

he criteria that have been considered a e:
1.

That the proposed transaction meets the test that
it is

n

nter

bes

2.

The effect of

3.

The e

t

e

0

0

c

t

ume

absen ee

rsh

in at on of

l

4.

r s.

0

c

5.

a

t

e

-'-

a

cred

'

i
1

t
m

t

a reaso abl

a n

capita

imp
acgui

t

P r

stability of

he a

r

1

a

t

nanc al
pub

c

t

l

6.

The impact on service standards, that is, that
the acquiring party has the proper managerial and
technical competence, experience, integrity and
financial responsibility to provide safe,
reasonable and adequate service to the public.

7.

Interference with regulatory jurisdiction, that
is, that the utility will continue to be subject
to applicable laws, principles and rules
governing the regulation of public utilities.

8.

The promotion of economies.

9.

The effect on rates.

10.

Fairness and reasonableness to shareholders.

11.

The effect of the transaction on the customer mix
and projected demand forecasts.

12.

The effect of the transaction on obligations to
employees with respect to pensions and other
benefits.

13.

In recent cases (particularly the UtahPacificorp proposal) the principal issue debated
related to transmission.

The concerns of other

electric systems were (1) that the resulting
company would have such a large transmission
system that it would have control of access to
transmission services, and would, therefore, be
able to foreclose competition in the bulk power
markets, and (2) that transmission by the
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systems.
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rious,
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name is
Un

ersi

of

San

c

i

Law

0

l.

, Cons
es.

Interest Law and edit the

the Interstate Commerce C
Federal Trade Commission,
1968;

ssion;
the

first

Nader

and

h

Folsom

1

(

).

Interest Law
consumer interests

s

1982,

more
rate

l

n

th

But
to

I

must

the util

es
s

now

cons

a

7

llar

asset merger have announced that they will
this Honorable Committee.
pending between various

I

not testify before

understand that

litigation is

parties to that merger.

But

I

would

argue that it is a transparent non sequitur to rely on pending
litigation to excuse public testimony on utility merger plans.
The

state

political

is

the

sovereign.

authority.

Its

It

is

our

Legislature

fundamental

is

the

unit of

single

most

important institution in our society, the repository of the power
to tax, to decide what is and what is not a criminal act, and to
protect the citizenry from a variety of abuses, including those
deriving from entities which have obtained dispensation from the
regulation of the marketplace.
monopolies, which are,

Power utilities are natural

to quote the regulatory law term of art

"affected with the public interest."
precious of privileges:

They are given that most

an exclusive

franchise

to provide a

necessity without competition.
Moreover, the owners of those utilities are entitled, as a
matter of law, to a "fair rate of return" on their investment.
The first element of a conceptual structure for this Committee is
a

full appreciation of this fact:

those stockholders providing

the equity capital to a utility have a constitutional right to a
market-related

rate

of

return

on

their

investment.

utility is entitled to assess ratepayers the full
operational expenses prudently incurred.

And

the

cost of all

Hence, those decisions

which are made affecting that cost structure, unless disallowed
by a Public Utilities Commission,

will determine what we pay.

And in the case of a momentous decision to merge operations, such

2

a

isallowanc

s state

s

Committee
1

fficult

i

respo

to

1

tio

a

ours

i

that

hearings 1

s

relevant to the variables we shall discuss,
rhetoric-1

f

ers (

s

s

11

not
not

answers

to

Jurisdiction

state

re

unc
a

state
icat

aut ority
6

ue

Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for certain filing
and disclosure
19 82

the

irements

Supreme

Court

cash tender
decided

interpreting the reach of that

Edgar

company

v.

federal

Illinois had attempted to review a

In

fers
Mite

Corporation

statute.

In Edgar,

tender offer for a Chicago

under its state takeover review law.

On a close vote,

the Court held that the Illinois Act was an "indirect burden" on
interstate commerce
requirements.
of interests:

and struck the

Illinois

statutory review

Note however, that this test involves a balancing
"Where the

statute regulates

evenhandedly to

effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden on

interstate

commerce

is

relation to the putative local benefits.

clearly

excessive

in

If a legitimate local

purpose is found, then the question becomes one of degree."

Pike

v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Some commentators believe that state laws such as the PUC's
power to review utility mergers
of

the Williams

Constitutionality

Act
of

and

1 generally fall

the

State

test.
Agproval

Acquisition or Transfer or Control of a

(See

the face
Berger,

Requirements
Co~~on

for

The
the

Carrier or Public

Utility, 14 Transportation Law Journal 227 (1986).)

I disagree.

Certainly there is a trend toward greater federal

involvement;

witness the anti-takeover provision in
Act enacted at the end of 1987.

This

Budget Reconciliation
s

ability of

state and local government to use tax-exempt bonds to purchase
gas

or electric

utilities.

But

the

generic

regulation

of

"no

of

to a

rna

to

util
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amendments to
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Mississ

Power

that the retail

Light must be pa
customers must

pay

by
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l

costs

as

allocated

notwithstanding a contrary judgement of the state commission with
purported authority over retail rates.
This case indicates two things: first, FERC jurisdiction may
be significant not only on the merger question,

but is rather

certain to be

extent merged

significant after

it.

To the

entities transfer power through separate entities, even entities
perhaps

created

specifically

successive transactions

to

manipulate

sales

(making them "wholesale"),

substantially subsume rate regulation at all levels.

through
they may
Where the

FERC declares that the price of power produced by power company
parent

"x"

to

subsidiary

"y"

is

their territory and that the

customers of "y" must pay it as specified, it is unclear what is
left for the state agency to do.
Is there a solution?
specifically
retail

Perhaps.

Here too,

e PUC jurisdiction over

provision

of

power,

and

the

PUC

legislation could
s

affecting

could be

required

to

intervene in all FERC proceedings which might impose pass through
costs onto its ratepayers.
Standards
The

most

minimal

test

for
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approval
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a

merger

is

illustrated by the policy of the Connecticut Department of Public
Utility Control.
utilities,
case
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efficiency leading to lower costs.

an advantage

11 generally rest on some economy of scale feature.
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i

important

to

consider

that

many

diseconomies of scale above a certain thres
beyond that level.

utilities

t

ld and many are

l

Our own studies of Pacific Bell's structure,

for example, strongly indicate that there is no
of scale structure.

1

Inherent economies of scale which may attend

increasing traffic across the same fixed cost structure are
especially unlikely in a merger where different territories are
simply hooked together.
It is possible that one company in a merged structure will
have assets
creating a

of particular
synergy.
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losing

in mind a

a

It

captive

market

is,

the

counter-

from

source

the

interchange,
"

assets

1

an

1

as

excess

use

if they are separate Y might s
or power

for
s

merged entity X might go to Y automat

asset

fundamental

more

11

That

that

partner and vice-versa,

theoretically be accomplished by contract
setting.

will

the

The sale or lease of an asset by one partner with

the other cou

merger

to

is

or
Y merge,

X

a
Z at

its

a

ratepayers.
The second possible
diverse base

of

supply

is
to
8

assure

acquisition of a more
more

st

le

provision

of

s

Re
assets
whole

ce

to

s rather unu

we
extreme

if

SCE

s

1

st

e

sources
power which could be made avai

to

ce

e excess

rat

at

assets

rates as SDG&E's more
they can be.

The third benefit to a merger may be
management

--

s

le
not

assuming the depart

out at a price making their

ence a

cated a more direct

oach to mana

I

f

strongly believe PUCs should repl
mu

as

a

e.

I

as

sible.

creates a

cost

at

goes out of business,

its

eve

stoc

ol

rs

notice

s

at
rat

ten
i

as

a

s

to meet
co t
rate

PUC

s

increase

ants

conditio

No PUC has ever used
s

cons

t

s at
9

u

r

s

s

int

e

o

op

wou

le to ma a

ref

b

hr

th

g

process.

of a
Dangers

first disadvantage to a merger is the
any augmentation of economic or pol
merger

involves

both.

outcome

cal power.

Lord Acton's

famous

corrupts, absolute power corrupts abso

.

And a uti
"

a

more

cliche; it underlies our system of checks and balances.

a natural monopoly is a necessary evil.

Making it geographically

or financially larger than the necessity of its natural monopoly
dictates,

and apart from any efficiency gain,

American

assumption

that

lar

larger

cuts against the

r

better.

A second and related general disadvantage to mergers

better.

be the enhanced
competitive

mo

structure

to

1

sector;

technological progress

or to

from

keep

competitive

t

and

ase

f

strate the regrettable cons
natural

forces
cost

11

stment structure.

a

not

better, local is

Indeed, all other things being equal, smaller

the

is

powers

ences

to

can

eel, cross

s.

The second

loss

l

That is, the regulator
operation with cost
performance of

the

decisiorill.akers,

even

10

with the

e measurement to

natural mon
ere

accounted

s

s not
rat

a

each

oly.
has

a

Having more
natural

monopo

sets
in

of
a

fferent
Not

on y

s

lator

t

, but there is

h

another team 1
s
to

The
pose

th

e costs.

for

state

regulators.
a

is
Allocating

n

a
It

to

a

contract between two self-interested util

with other options,

than to pierce the self-serving

an undifferentiated whole.
ma

costs

very difficult

major area of regulatory law as a result.
examine a

i

Where a merger occurs,

external transactions accomplish

a ve

throu

marketplace are now internalized, as I have noted.

real

Where a

merged firm has affiliates in the competitive sector, or natural
a

monopolies subject to other jurisdictions, there
regulatory confusion.

What is a fair price for what?

liated entity be audited?

?

What rate

e

Can the
rate

How does one calculate

return
s

si n

trickle

reclosi g much
il

to bi
effect

e

wholesale transfer
which are

ly to

e

j

Perhaps of greater concern,

the extent of the FERC jursidiction

is to a

control

1

ee

t

l

entities
11

the uti

creates to transfer

s

to

1 level.

It enhances its opportunity to "

loose

or excess

" for

s

e

Conclusion

It is well possible that the SDG&E-SCE
for

is ju

may be some very unusual reasons.

But as a

proposition, mergers pose serious dangers w
benefits.

1

ut automatic

The current standard for approval is

does not reflect the balance

the

The notion that the regulator must find or some

ly non-

existent intervenor must prove adverse consequences, although it
appears

to

be

presumption.

the

applicable

test,

reverses

the

proper

Legislation should provide at both state and

federal levels that the proponents of a merger must affirmatively
demonstrate an enhancement of the public interest.
There are two aspects of public interest benef
should be the focus of that showing.
be required to show,

First, the proponent should

as a threshold matter,

merger on

to
ses to "lower rates" for the

customers

one or

f

structure

cost

utili

the impact of the

costs.

this showing from

ed

levels,

s.

is

of

like

for

We must
th

en~

We are
the

f

ed

plant

ies,

extant

without and

projected traff

the proposed
oductivi ty

which

erest
s ructure

f

or

provi

this

necessary service -- not intentions as to immediate pricing
policies.

12

to

1

area
cours

i

t

s

ere

a
are

si

proponents should have the
interest.

And final

to
that

showing must be
a .,::....

and numbers, on
must depend
rtic

a proactive

ion of intervenors for c

consumer interests.

on

and
tit

secto

for

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Remarks of
MICHAEL J. STRUMWASSER
SPECIAL ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL

ON ANTITRUST CONCERNS RAISED BY
MERGERS IN THE
UTILITY INDUSTRY

Before the Joint

SENATE ENERGY AND

of the
ES COMMITTEE

ASSEMBLY UTILITIES AND COMMERCE COMMITTEE

County

irman
Genera

1

scuss some

to j

plea

, I am

e

concerns-raised

t

li

vertical

rti

c

utilities.
outset, please

At

me a

sc

s

ls

competing

c

Company have doubtless quickened everyone 1 s interest

this

topic, the Attorney General has not, at this time, made
of thorough antitrust ana

is

or both of these proposa s

alteration of its terms.
11

I

I

whether

sents antitrust

t consurnmat

litate

t

to

i

1 or s

of

al
committees

therefore trust

am not

to

a

wou

se transa

on

fer

trust
Ins
of

lar

ems

utilities
note

way
our

fice

over

s

1 is,

to

course, a
actions on

icer
lf of

state
state

s

antitrust laws.

to en

retreat from antitrust

od
f

st s
by the

1 government, Attorney General Van de Kamp has led a
the Attorneys General of the fifty states to
consumers and markets neglected by the federal offic

ls.

This has resulted in coordinated actions by state Attorneys
1 to adopt uniform enforcement policies and to bring

coordinated enforcement actions where the interests

several

states are affected.
Because the federal enforcement agencies have been
particularly reluctant to challenge mergers that violate the
antitrust laws, our efforts have focused in this area.

Concerned

about the U.S. Department of Justice's relaxation of merger
enforcement standards, Attorney General Van de Kamp and Attorney
1 Robert Abrams of New York drafted guidelines for state

of antitrust laws governing horizontal mergers.£/

en
1.
§§

5

15

u.s.c.

S§ 15, 18, 26; Calif. Bus. & Prof. Code 1

17204.
or

ing of two
erent
., a manu cturer
a
a dist
tor
)· Because California's
utilities
vertically-integrated -, distributing
bulk, selling it at
lesa
other utilities,
it at retail to consumers
involving such
horizontal
vertical
res analysis of
both dimensions. As I note
, however, since
competition
lity indus
is severe
circumscribed, and since vertical integration has created such
s
competitive concerns over the years, the vertical
is is
more cri cal
the
cal utili
merger case.

2

wa

1

ati
1987

of

e

antitrust enforcement

states

i

1

brought the first
1.

s

Van
lifornia

As

General
li

llenged the

supermarket chains, obtaining a

st
1

is

presently maintaining those two firms as
entities.

In

case, we

to es

i

state

antitrust law prohibit anticompetitive corporate mergers 1 but
last week, the California Supreme Court rej

our reading of

the Cartwright Act, ruling four-to-three against our challenge to
Texaco's 1984 a

si

of

1

ice
enforcement of antitrust laws
976 to 1872,

also
ili

From
sources --

s

f

f

1
0

1

on is
fore

s

of

is
79;

6.

tent to

ree-ma.rket

to
whi

e would

court to

were an anti

i

1

s is an a
prediction is diffi

,

rea

it is

courts have not

st
l

merger as determinative of

a

1

t the

l of a utility

1

iance

sect

o

Clayton Act .2/
In any regulatory review of a utility merger, although

substantive standard will be the
the merger is

itional

tion of

st,

st

ic

the "

an

considerations must be cons

11

i

both

federal and state application of the standa
Insight

the nature

e

c

utili

1

assess

11

u.
7.

658;

ition,

3

sources.

f irrns'

II.

UTI

tic

While it. is
monopol

given exc

I

s

utili

es are

lated

f

is now also

ce,

competition with each

a

variety of markets, f

a
to

Antitrust analysis has rna
t a transaction takes

mere fact

ace

ff is not

i

th

sistent

se

Most of

p

we

c utili

el

lesale'1

of as the
s

l

uti i
ma

ce

es.

e

As

transa

for

ces

of

between

--

t
li

s

some

s

t

is

antitrust

uti
transact ons,

courts

s a measure

ition at

of

served by a si

9.

are
i

e

-users en

27.

competition

sf

resources.

t

rt cular
rates to en
Finally

i i

1

es

ce
to

it is

extent f

subject to termination or renewal,
11

se

fran

The poli

ses are

courts

ze
ut

II

of

for new

cu tamers a

to settle

ial

not

t

trust

es.

as

been

applied to public utilities, then, can be summa

as

encouraging free markets and the maximum competi

all areas

where state or federal has not

ition.

Antitrust ana

to

is

characterization of the competi
and a geographic
ition can

zones
antitrust

1

it

arena, whi
11/
.-

consists of a
racterization of

a

case to case,

on

c utili

is

c

re

f

t

0

izat

t

rust case

s

(or, more
t are re

ces)

t

isions by

10.
366;
Cir. 1981)

410
(2d

u.s.

11.

v.

1962

370

u.s.

294.

s one
ter

s

ces 1' as a
sa

of

meant to

s

rom
f

sa

for a

term to

and

s
re
0

has

u

tran

II

is a

event,

is, as I

is

s

c rna

f

recognition
ut

In

oy

f

is

tran
s as far as a

ial

services

its

can practicably reach
ssion

c

I

se ler or
stance 1

a

, contractua

economics of transmission arrangements.

For present

ses, it

is sufficient to note that different economists would place San
Diego in markets ranging from, on the one hand 1 Southern
California to, on the other hand,
of

entire Pacific Coast and

Southwest.
In evaluating a merger

wou

first look at the degree

rna

s( before and after

is industry, then, a court
concentration in each of these
It would then

examine other factors having implications for competition between
li

I

.

i

rticu ar

measure o

is

rna

i

u.s.
u.s.

for

4.
350;
656.

t

a

contro s.

v.

=..::::..!..!!c:..::::.-=-=:.:::..:::::.==-.=::..=:..:==:.:=:...-==:= 1

==::::..1
399
supra , 418

its

ana
s

0

one firm

s

forec

es o
resource --

t

markets,

as

e
rna

to
Often

f

a u

a

to common re ources

util

may

11

resource,

it c

Until 1973,

s

ut 1

1

a
o ted

l

rticu1ar

ition

c

control of ess

now clear that util

on reas

to

a

negotiating such rights can

fficult ta

For present purposes,
about a merger

s to be rai

st

most

increased control over transmission

two e

city?

enable one or both to arrogate to itself tran
wou

se

to bid for on the

or a court can satis

a

1

itself

c utili

s

Will the merger
ssion capacity it
?

rna

Unless an
11 not

t

to foreclosure of markets due to control of transmission
i

, a

wou

unl

to

ss ant

t

ter.

s

s

li

a
34

u.s.
83.

16.

v.

410

66.
7.
1

u.s.

load

a

rec
1

s to a
When a

s

terns

it

iate

, at
to

As

to
ct ca

a
reci

matter, a

f

tion serv

1

ss

e

ce dif

s

cal

A

t

a
smal

to a

itors.

ze on

ce-

is

esa

at

a

st

trust concern

utility is selling
util

cost

at a hi

retail customers in its s

is
A spec

utilities merge.

ce

1

is

t

ce area.
ses

If there is greater resistance to the
one utili

customers

r

ired are re

if the customers of the firm to

e,

-- for

to lose

their local company -- there may be an effort to neutralize
jections with the promise of lower rates than in other
tories.

Such non-cost-bas

price-discrimination would

raise antitrust concerns.

IV.

ION
In i

1 terms,

s most

a merger in

antitru t

of

try concern the foreclosure

electric utility

a

a

a

's 1

resources,
loses

ce

i

more

or
ce.

Is

1

to

Because that case

resources

hi

resource-allocat
18.
1
zes in
L.Rev. 103.

utili

to
ces,

ce for

a

allocat
antitrust
on

favor
open market.

426 u.s. 271 see
t
s Laws to
ce
1979) 54
.John's

tions.
California utilities
to

scrut
t

THE
ENERGY
UTILITIES
UTILITIES AND COMMERCE:

A DISCUS ION
THE PAC FI

POWER & LIGHT MERGER

nv

1

the Federal
final action on the
approval.

ss our

is
(FERC) is nearing
about
ing

The merger is part of a long-term effort
re
Pacific
for success in a more competit
energy services marketplace.
Just how compet ive that marketplace is can be
strated by
that one-thi
Pacific's sales volume, or about 700
is
by loss to ons
ion
ave
commercia sectors.
rial
rily res dential
i
, or 700 ave
is
ls.
threatened by loss to competition

Many customers
non-utility suppl
,
providers. They want,
levels of quality or reli
sole suppliers of electr
load demands lose pred
ies,
have increa

the

At
flex il
must continue re
When
bear

assures all
merged

ir

services. We are continually
for better ways to serve customers,
lower costs, and
stabi ize and reduce prices. We want to enhance industrial
commercial development in the states where we operate.
will
cts on both compan
It
ial
in net
It
11
e us to
more efficient
generating resources,
make additional
esale sales at enhanced sales
In addition, it will
savings in such areas as audit
, data processing,
es, insurance, legal, shareholder relations, and power
ing.
effie
ies.
new power supplies.
substantial benefits to
and long-term

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MICHAEL SHAMES
BEFORE THE OCTOBER 24 HEARING OF SENATE COMMITTEE
ON ENERGY AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
The mergermania that has gripped California energy utilities
in recent months poses a number of very complicated and profound
questions.

The most important of these questions are notable for

their long-term significance:
o What wil I be the structure of California's energy utility
industry at the end of this century?
o How will intrastate and interstate competition be affected?
o Wil 1 the merger imperil the municipal energy utilities?
These are but a few of the significant long-term questions
that must be addressed if this Committee is to tackle the issues
raised by the utility mergers.
For today,

I wish to focus my comments upon the concerns of

the residential and smal 1 business customer class raised by the
recent Tuscon and Edison merger proposals.

The most frequently

raised question by our members is how will

these mergers affect

our electric and gas rates?
UCAN's evaluation has been hampered by SDG&E's delay and SCE's
failure to make public any substantiative documentation for their
respective promises to lower rates.
Our preliminary assessment suggests that neither merger will
directly lead to appreciably

lower rates.

SDG&E's rates have

been dropping since 1985 and should continue to drop until
end of this decade.

the

Aggressive and astute energy practices wil 1

keep rates at reasonable levels through the next decade.

The

Tuscon merger merely throws into doubt SDG&E's ability to exploit
the energy marketplace.

~

;: :;. £
t=

"""'='

e T t= s

r.,::, t

t i m on y

nw i

e

each par

s

uc

E

~100

infla

a

ates

y with SDG&E's by

&E rates

ms

rgy

s n

pea

ext yec.r.

mi II ion,

f

enticement.

g and may

be

Edison's promise to

a merger is approved,

The on y way t

at such a

red ction would be approved by the CPUC is if Edison could show
syste~wide

s

efficiencies stemming from the merger of the SCE and

E s stems.

a

SCE would probably not be permitted to engage in

discriminatory reduction of San Diego rates without comparably

lowering its own rates in Orange,
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lower rates.
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Frankly,

Edison's track record has prompted a

large number

our members to welcome it~ proposed take-over of SDG&E.
But UCAN is very concerned that Edison's alleged management
prowess may we! I be offset by San Diego's loss of a
utility.
of
a

locally based

If the Edison merger occurs, San Diego would become one

the largest,

if not the largest,

city in this country without

locally based utility company.
San Diego's civic leaders are painfully aware of the cost

that is imposed when a city loses a major company headquarters.
We note that SDG&E's record of donations to San Diego civic and
charitable organizations, while not particularly generous,

is as

much as five times that of Pacific Bell, which serves as San
Diego's telephone utility but is headquartered in San Francisco.
Of greater concern toUCAN is the fact that San Diego's
future is indelibly tied to its energy future.

A power utility

should be dependent upon the health of the community it serves,
so that there is a mutuality of

interest.

Either merger wi II

diminish that commitment to the future of San Diego.

Any merger

approval must be conditioned upon a mechanism that would ensure
mutuality of commitment.
There are four additional concerns that are somewhat
technical,
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's jurisdiction.
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In general, labor does not support mergers as it results in
the loss of Union jobs.

These jobs provide

~ages

and

benefits that still enable Americ n citizens, through hard
work and perseverance, to buy homes, send children to college
and have access to adequate medical care and retirement.
Union jobs also promote safety and dignity in the workplace.
We carry the fight for these ideals for all working men and
women, Union and non-Union.

We now number 17-18% of the work

force and this presence benefits al

working people as the

standard employers must meet to gain the services of the work
force.

The loss of any

people.

ion job is a loss to all working

Southern California Edison Corporation's (SCE Corp)

merger plans are therefore particularly offensive since they
include the los
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opens the door for hard working Americans. whose labor built
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to lose homes and other investments, or to

e r

neg ect their medical needs, and the needs of

amilies

in order to prevent financ al disasters.

is comes from a company. S

ich ha
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8 ye rs of

It is very unlikely that SCE would maintain

record profits.

or increase the benefits of another utility's employees under
these conditions,

conditions which include reducing

eir

work force by nearly 25%.

The Utility Workers Union of America recognizes the strong
federal and corporate influences presently favoring utility
mergers.

Given our understanding of utility operations, and

our expansion from traditional labor issues, we offer further
perspective

e merge s bein

on

con

red in Southern

lifornia.

o low r
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is trend is likely to continue as SCE

rough
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as on Energy,
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and the utility continues to move more of

e burden of these purchases on to

SCE and SDG&E,

1

through its proposed

_,_

e residential consumer.

erger with
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Electric Power Co., is moving to acquire long term access to
coal fired capacity, which costs about 1/2 to 1/3 as much as
gas fired capacity, and 1/4 the cost of purchased power.

The

combined utility would have nearly 1/3 of its generation mix
supplied by this inexpensive coal capacity, guaranteeing
markets for this capacity and lowering costs to Southern
California ratepayers.

SCE, on the other hand, appears committed to acquiring
expensive purchased power to meet generation needs, a cost
which is passed on directly to the consumer.

This is

particularly significant when it is noted that fuel

and

purchased power is the greatest single expense of a utility.

Given the diverse directions SCE and SDG&E appear to be
headed, and SDG&Eioutstanding performance prospects, it is
understandable that SCE would move to acquire SDG&E without
including Tucson Electric Power.

is would keep Southern

California consumers captive to expensive power purchases,
and prevent comparisons between these nei

boring utilities 1

rates and performances, eliminating the adverse effects such
comparisons could have on the ratemaking process and in
attracting investor capital.

Finally, because the merger between SCE and SDG&E would
evidently be hostile, it will be very costly.
will be borne by all -

These costs

the ratepayers. investors and

-3-

employees who must sacrifice to pay for this merger.

e

only "winners" in this type of speculation are the investment
bankers and Wall Street enthusiasts.
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Business Agent, Local 246
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